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THE UNTOLD STORY OF NEODEVELOPMENTISM: A NEW STATE-LED LAND RUSH ON TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THE POOR

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Introduction

Despite the fact the goal of this paper is not to make an in-depth analysis of the ongoing debate regarding the theoretical foundations and applied implications of the so-called "New Developmentism" (which I will refer to as Neodevelopmentism), I will start with a preliminary review of some the competing ideas about the nature of this phenomena. This is necessary because of the applied consequences for the adoption of public policies in Brazil is directly aligned with some of the theoretical assumptions of the so-called Neodevelopmentists. However, the essential point that I intend to make in this article is that some of the more acute consequences of Neodevelopmentism on traditionally marginalized segments of the Brazilian population were not yet fully addressed by the academic community. This gap is present in the studies that have criticized the eclectic recipes suggested by the formulators of Neodevelopmentism (Fiori, 2011; Sampaio Jr., 2012). In order to make a contribution to fill this gap, I have selected two features that I consider to be presently absent in most of the critical reviews on Neodevelopmentism, namely the process of land expropriation (or land grabbing) and environmental deregulation.

These two features are key to the understanding of how the eclectic combination of neoliberal policies and State participation in fomenting economic growth that entails the existence of Neodevelopmentism-oriented policies that

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have ultimately led to the forced removal peasants, fishermen and *quilombolas* from their traditional territories and also compromised the capacity of environmental agencies to regulate the construction of large projects intended to improve the Brazilian capacity to participate in global markets, mostly in the form of ports, railways and highways which have been identified as potential bottlenecks for economic dynamism.

At this point in time, there are many places in Brazil where large infrastructure projects are being built in territories that previously were neither abandoned nor unproductive. In addition, these places share a common feature which is the presence of traditional communities formed by native Brazilians, family farmers, *quilombolas* and fishermen. Some of the most striking cases of forced removal of traditional communities are related to the so-called "port industrial complexes" that are being built from scratch or being enlarged on the coastal areas with some special cases in the states of Ceará, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro (Albuquerque, M.F.C., 2005; Pérez, M.S. and Gonçalves, C.U. 2012; Pessanha et al, 2013, Quintslr, S, 2014) (Figure 1). In all of these cases, the argument used by private and State actors to justify their actions against existing communities and social groups living in areas targeted for transformation can be tracked back to the implementation of Neodevelopmentism.




Figure 1. Map of Brazil showing the location of the Pecém, Suape and Açú. Industrial and Port Complexes.

This paper will focus on the case of the Açú Superport Industrial Complex (CISPA) that is being on the north coast of Rio de Janeiro state to illustrate how the Neodevelopmentism paradigm is being employed to justify the displacement of entire communities without previous financial compensation or any genuine resettlement projects. In addition, CISPA is also a good case to analyze a new model of fast-track approach that is being implemented to expedite the environmental license process. Despite the fact that CISPA was originally initiated by the EBX Group, the economic conglomerate owned by the former Brazilian billionaire Eike Batista, it was included in the *Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento*- the Growth Acceleration Program- (PAC) funded by the Brazilian federal government. The CISPA case is also a showcase for the intrinsic connections between endogenous and global capital that are fostered by the Neodevelopmentism paradigm. Finally, the main argument of this paper is that CISPA is not an exception but the rule in terms of the social, economic and environmental consequences of Neodevelopmentism.

Neodevelopmentism: a way out of Neoliberal policies or just an old wine in a new bottle?

Regardless of the ongoing disputes around the nature and actual meaning of Neodevelopmentism, most authors tend to agree that Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, a professor of Economics of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo as one of the early proponents of Neodevelopmentism in Brazil⁴. In one of his early works on the subject, Bresser-Pereira (2006) indicates the failure of Neoliberal policies had created a positive environment for the return of the national State as a prominent actor in the efforts to promote economic growth, and not just the role of enforcer of good fiscal behavior as preached by the neoliberal ideology. But from the start, Bresser-Pereira emphasized that Neodevelopmentism does not mean a return to the old development policies that were widely adopted in Latin America under the formulas proposed by CEPAL (the Economic Commission for Latin America). Instead, Neodevelopmentism would be a set of measures designed to, in one hand, strengthen the role of the State in fomenting economic growth while, on the other hand, avoiding the vices and distortions of the “old developmentism” recipes. In practical terms, Bresser-Pereira suggested the adoption of policies to empower State and market forces to achieve sustainable economic growth and to, consequently, maintain macroeconomic stability, promote internal savings, and accelerate investments and private innovation (Morais e Saad-Filho, 2011). Additionally Oreiro (2012) stresses out that in the Neodevelopmentalism paradigm, economic growth is expected to be “pulled” by exports and sustained by private and public investment in the expansion of productive capacity and basic infrastructure.

The rejection of a return to the “old developmentism” approach is also present in the work of Sicsú, Paula and Michel (2007). For Sicsú and collaborators, the past strategies aimed at fostering economic development had ultimately undermined the long-term prospects for success because of excessive protection against foreign competitors and the lack of stimulus for innovation. To avoid repeating past mistakes, they suggested the adoption of a more eclectic set of proposals to strengthen both the State and the market to foster a relationship in

⁴, Ironically, Bresser-Pereira was responsible for implementing some of the striking neoliberal policies applied during the government of president Fernando Henrique Cardoso,

which the former would play an active role to provide capital and other forms of incentive to the later in order to increase productivity and innovation.

The eclectic nature of the Neodevelopmentism is emphasized by different authors (Boito Jr. and Berringer, 2013, Boschetti, 2013; Fiori, 2011) have already analyzed its conceptual foundations. From their critics, two main features seem to be the most telling of how Neodevelopmentism was engineered. In the one hand, the set of policies adopted by presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff had been used by their predecessor, president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and included the support for internal consumption, an increased capitalization of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) to finance Brazilian corporations; the establishment of policies to support the efforts of Brazilian corporations to increase the trade of commodities to global markets, and a set of fiscal measures to control the effects of international economic crisis. On the other hand, Neodevelopmentism abandons, at least partially, some of the central propositions of “old developmentism” that included the pursuit for strong internal markets and the development of the national industry. Instead, the Neodevelopmentism strategies favor the promotion of an export-led growth regime (Gonçalves, 2012; Oreiro, 2012). As a result, Sampaio Jr. (2012) suggests that Neodevelopmentism is not more than a parochial response to the crisis of neoliberal policies, and it does not question the structural problems affecting the economic development of Brazil. In addition, Sampaio Jr. points out that the enthusiasm of Neodevelopmentists concerning the place of international capital and the agribusiness and mining sectors in pulling the economic growth process only exposes a clear commitment to maintain the persistent inequalities that plague Brazilian society.

The applied agenda of Neodevelopmentism for responding to the global economic crisis of 2008

The early success of Neodevelopmentism in Brazil can be partially attributed to a unique combination of factors, beginning with an unexpected rise in the value of commodities (Prates e Marçal, 2008). However, and exactly because of this dependence, this favorable environment was strongly affected by the global economic recession caused by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States.

Naudé (2009) points that the economies of developing countries (Brazil included) were affected by the global economic crisis that followed the situation in the USA, mainly because of the reduction in export earnings and of financial inflows from developed nations.

Despite the tensions created by the global economic crisis, some the eclectic recipes originated from the Neodevelopmentism were used to counterbalance this hostile economic environment. An example was the set of loans given by BNDES to Brazilian companies that reached a total US\$ 160 billion, just between 2009 and 2011 (Almeida, 2011). Most of these loans were given to a small number of companies which were chosen to be “national champions” of Neovelopmentism, a formula that resembles a similar strategy adopted by the “Asian tigers” to foster their economic development⁵. Another feature of this response was the effective implementation of many projects planned by the PAC, a grant national program launched by President Lula da Silva in 2007 to improve Brazil’s capacity to export agricultural and mineral commodities (Teixeira, 2007), and had an initial budget of roughly 250 billion dollars over a period of four years (Brasil, 2007).

CISPA: A complex designed to move commodities the global markets

From the start, CISPA was an ambitious project, especially when it was seen on the drawing board. With an initial budget of US\$ 40 billion and a declared potential to create 235,000 jobs between 2008 and 2025, CISPA was presented by the EBX Group⁶ as the largest transportation and industrial hub under construction in the Americas. The so-called Industrial District of São João da Barra (DISJB) where the industrial component of the CISPA is going to be located will encompass a total area of 7,036 hectares (AGB, 2011)

⁵ This term was initially used in reference to Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan that achieved high economic growth rates and rapid industrialization between the early 1960s and 1990s.

⁶The EBX Group was formed in the 1980s to focus on identifying investment opportunities in infrastructure and natural resources. Until being hit by an economic tsunami, the EBX Group was formed by the following companies: MMX (mining), LLX (logistics), MPX (energy), OGX (oil and gas), AUX (gold), CCX (coal) and OSX (offshore industry). In 2014, most of these companies have being sold to foreign corporations and global investment funds.

One of the stated goals of the CISPA is to offer passage for a high grade pellet feed that will be transported through a new 525 km long pipeline that is being built by the steel giant Anglo American to bring the production from its mines in the state of Minas Gerais to the Açú Superport for transport to its consumption markets (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Map showing the location of the CISPA in the municipality of São João da Barra and the Anglo American slurry pipeline, Source: Pedlowski, 2012, modified from AGB (2011)

But in addition to being a future exportation hub, CISPA is expected to host a series of industrial and energy installations that should include at least two steel plants, a shipyard and two thermoelectric plants (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Map showing the location of different projects that form CISPA. Source: Pedlowski, 2012, modified from AGB (2011)

Another justification for the location of CISPA is the proximity to large oil reserves located in the Pre-Salt Layer in which the OGX, a subsidiary of the EBX Group, has significant exploration rights. In this regard, the CISPA should become a major logistic hub which will prove useful to the oil industry over the coming decades. An overarching goal for the construction CISPA is the strengthening of Brazil's access to global markets. A move of the Brazilian government highlights the efforts to make CISPA a prime location for the exportation of mineral and agricultural commodities. This move came with the launching of federal program designed to increase and to improve the existing road and railway networks. The so-called "*Programa de Logística para Rodovias e Ferrovias*," "Logistic Program for Highways and Railways" was launched by President Dilma Rousseff in August of 2012 with an initial budget of US\$ 65 billion. Despite being formally a private enterprise, the CISPA was included in this network, thereby connecting it by railway to soybean and sugarcane production areas located in the Brazilian Midwest.

The connectivity to commodities producing areas that is being planned through the construction of railways network is not the only form of support that CISPA is receiving from the Brazilian government. Because of its inclusion in the PAC program, different components of CISPA became eligible for subsidized loans

from the Federal government. An example federal funding for CISPA is a loan of US \$ 1.3 billion given to OSX for the construction of a shipyard by two State-banks, BNDES and Caixa Econômica Federal⁷.

The use of eminent domain and fast-track environmental licensing as tools to grab land to facilitate the construction of CISPA

An initial limitation faced by the EBX Group was to secure enough land to build all the planned industrial plants. However, the area selected for installing the CISPA, the Fifth District of São João da Barra, was traditionally occupied by small farmers and fishermen under different levels of land tenure arrangements. In addition, despite predominant sandy soils, the small farmers located in the Fifth District were considered very productive and important producers of several cash crops (e.g., pineapple, okra, pumpkin and maxixe (a vegetable very similar to cucumber that was probably brought to Brazil from Africa) that are consumed in the city of Rio de Janeiro. As a result of attachment to a territory to which they were attached by family ties and productive experience, most farmers were not willing to sell their land neither in to be resettled elsewhere.

In order to guarantee the land needed by the EBX Group to install CISPA, the government of Rio de Janeiro state exercised the provisions of eminent domain to issue four decrees to expropriate farmland “in the public interest⁸”. These decrees that impacted directly an unspecified number of families (the total number ranges from 750 to 1,500 families) that have been living in the region and mainly occupied in small farming and fishing. Although the use of eminent domain⁹ is not new in Brazil, the case of CISPA is controversial because the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 provides a series of safeguards against expropriation of land that is considered productive. In addition, the legal basis for the use of eminent domain to expropriate land from farmers and fishermen is the Decree 3365 of 1941 that does not supersede the chapter on law rights present in the 1988 Constitution

In addition to the disputes around of the legality of land expropriation and resettlement strategies, the fast-track approach used by the state government to

⁷ According to Bloomberg, the total of loans given by BNDES to the EBX Group reached around US\$ 4.5 billion dollars. See <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-15/batista-cos-contracted-9-1-blm-reais-in-bndes-loans-bank-says.html>.

⁸ These decrees were the following: 42.584 e 41.585/2008, and 41.915 and 41.916/2009

⁹ In Brazil, eminent domain is applied under the banner of “land expropriation in the public interest”.

issue environmental licenses for the different projects to be built inside CIPA also generated opposition. A first problem was the decision by the Rio de Janeiro environmental agency, Instituto Estadual do Ambiente (INEA), to evaluate each project separately. The argument used to justify this approach was the need to expedite the licensing process. However, opponents of this fast-track approach pointed to the possibility that this approach would preclude the calculation of the overall emissions of pollutants and its combined impacts on the local aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems (AGB, 2011). A second, but highly important problem was the fact public hearings, required by law, were organized individually. This strategy favored the interests of the companies interested in obtaining licenses because it precluded a more comprehensive evaluation of the social and environmental repercussions created by the synergistic interactions among the different projects. In addition, public hearings were held mostly at night and none was conducted in the Fifth District, thus precluding broader public participation.

CISPA may not be ready but the alarm bells are already ringing

For the sake of clarity, I will organize my analysis of some of the problems surrounding the construction of CISPA in two main subsections. The first will address the actions of the state government and the EBX Group to grab land and the reaction from the affected farmers, and the second will examine a myriad of environmental problems that followed its construction. It is important to note that these two set of issues are not mutually exclusive and actually compound a very unique combination of problems set by the application of the Neodevelopmentism agenda.

State-led land grabbing and the tactics used to neutralize the resistance

The first land takeovers led by CODIN occurred in the beginning of 2010 and caught most farmers and fishermen by surprise. The operations usually involved an overwhelming display of force that included the use of large number of policemen and private security working for the EBX Group (Figure 4).



Figure 4. Military Police block entry of a farm at the time it is being expropriated. The sign on the middle of the image informs that the farm is now privately owned by CODIN.

During the operations carried out to expropriate farms, households were reduced to rubble and any existing crops were completely destroyed to avoid any attempt by the farmers to return to the farms (Figure 5).



Figure 5. Destruction of a house and crops inside a farm expropriated by CODIN in the Fifth District of São João da Barra.

A manifest goal of strategy for expedite land takeovers was to rapidly secure land necessary for the construction of the infrastructure needed to start the operation in the Açú Port. After an initial period of surprise, farmers begun to

organize the resistance and created the “*Associação dos Proprietários de Imóveis e Moradores de São João da Barra (ASPRIM)*”, to organize the resistance against the expropriation of their properties.

A first problem faced by ASPRIM to organize the resistance was the fact that, contrary to what is determined by the Brazilian constitution, the right to access the lawsuits filed by CODIN was not granted to affected landowners. Another mechanism used to difficult the farmers’ capacity to defend their land rights was the use by CODIN of a legal artifice through which lawsuits were filed against “unknown defendants” in nearly 10% of the cases. These legal maneuvers were primarily intended to guarantee a rapid takeover of the areas set for expropriation, and secondarily could be part of an effort to neutralize the growing opposition posed by farmers organized by ASPRIM. In any case, a concrete outcome was the fact that the actual number of expropriated farms was never publicized, despite a lawsuit filed by ASPRIM against CODIN.

A second and crucial problem regarding the land takeovers led by CODIN is related to the payment of financial compensations owed by the state to the expropriated farmers. An initial element of contention was the fact that CODIN hired private legal experts to conduct the evaluation of individual farms, and in most cases prices were below what was deemed as fair by the farmers (AGB, 2011). In fact, Medeiros (2013) found that prices paid to farmers ranged from US\$ 0.98 to US\$ 3.62. Because of this situation, many farmers are contesting the value offered by CODIN in the courts.

But in terms of explaining this discrepancy, there is the fact that the EBX Group approached many families to buy their land, and those that refused any negotiation ended being sued by CODIN. In a potential conflict of interests, there is evidence that the EBX Group transferred funds directly to CODIN which subsequently paid the costs of land expropriation at prices that were below their market values (Figure 6).



Figure 6. Facsimile of a bank check issued by LLX to pay for the expropriation of a farm at the Fifth District¹⁰.

A third problem involving the land takeovers was the transference of land rights to the EBX Group after the families were removed from their land, a fact that confronts the legal statutes regarding land expropriation in Brazil. In addition, an ingenious strategy was used to mask this process which consisted of placing signs attributing land ownership to CODIN while the land rights were already transferred to LLX (the company responsible for the construction of the Açú Port). In some cases, ownership signs of CODIN and LLX were placed in nearby properties and provide an unequivocal proof of this intimate relationship between private and public agents (Figure 7).

¹⁰ This document can be accessed at <http://www.robortomoraes.com.br/2014/08/os-desapropriados-do-acu-continuum.html>.



Figure 7. Ownership signs of CODIN and LLX of expropriated farms along the main access road to the Açú Port.

A fourth problem was the controversial effort to impose the resettlement of expropriated families in the so-called “Vila da Terra”. The Vila da Terra was present in the publicity disseminated by the EBX Group as a model for fair resettlement, but most eligible farmers rejected being settled there because of a myriad of problems (e.g., precariousness of water and electricity services, restrictions on planting perennial crops, lack of land titles). But the key element surrounding this resettlement program was that it was carried out by the EBX Group and not by the state government. In addition, Medeiros (2013) verified that a significant number of the families settled at Vila da Terra were not farmers removed from expropriated farms, but included squatters, petty dealers and fishermen.

Environmental degradation as another unwelcomed legacy of Neodevelopmentism

Latini (2014) conducted a preliminary assessment of the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) prepared by CODIN to secure the environmental license required for the construction of the DISJB. After analyzing the document, Latini observed the widespread use of a very generic language to address the potential social and environmental problems that could arise from installing an industrial

park inside the DISJB. The result of this approach was the lack of specific programs to mitigate eventual damages caused to natural ecosystems and the local communities. This loose approach regarding risk control seems to be a given fact under the fast-track environmental licensing process developed to accelerate projects that are developed to implement the infrastructural component set by the Neodevelopmentism agenda. Interestingly enough, at least two of the negative environmental impacts anticipated in the Environmental Impact Reports (EIR) prepared to obtain the environmental licenses needed for the construction of the CISPA and the DISJB have already become visible.

The problem was initially detected in November of 2012 when farmers began to suspect that their freshwater reservoirs and groundwater were contaminated with salt. The farmers' suspicions were later confirmed by sampling campaigns made by researchers linked to the Environmental Sciences Laboratory at the Universidade Estadual do Norte Fluminense (UENF). At the farmer's request, the UENF researchers collected water samples in multiple points in the area surrounding the CISPA. Their analysis confirmed that freshwater reservoirs were salinized and that, in some samples, water electrical conductivity values (e.g., 40,000 $\mu\text{S}/\text{cm}$) were near the levels found in ocean water (i.e., 56,000 $\mu\text{S}/\text{cm}$)¹¹. After initially denying any responsibility, the EBX Group publicly recognized that the salt had come from dredging waste saturated with sea water that had deposited in 5 meters high dumps to dry¹². However, the EBX Group representatives insisted that high salinity levels were just a temporary and spatially restricted problem, On top of that, the EBX Group argued that the problem had been forecasted in the EIR.

Confronted with the evidence of salt contamination, the secretary of Environment, Carlos Minc, organized a press conference in February 01, 2013 to inform that a US\$ 650,000.00 fine was applied to the EBX Group for the environmental disaster occurred at CISPA¹³. However, despite the small value of

¹¹ A water sample collected in July of 2014 in the channel surrounding the dumps showed that water electrical conductivity was 31,000 $\mu\text{S}/\text{cm}$; a finding which corroborates the assertion made by local farmers that almost two years after the main spill event, their water resources are still affected by high salinity.

¹² See <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/07/11/uk-brazil-batista-insight-idUKBRE96A07220130711>

¹³ See <http://www.rj.gov.br/web/sea/exibeconteudo?article-id=1432813> .

that fine, the EBX Group placed an administrative challenge before the State Secretary of Environment to transform the pecuniary penalty in community services. Despite the EBX Group and state government claims regarding this incident, several farmers have initiated lawsuits against the two sides seeking financial compensation for their economic losses and cases are still pending.

Other evidence that CISPA is affecting the local environment has surfaced at Barra do Açu, the closest coastal village to the port, where erosion has consumed most of the beach berm. Local people are linking the quick loss of beach area to the construction of two piers and a harbor breakwater for the Açu Port¹⁴. In this case, the EIR had also forecasted that the construction of CIPA could cause the destruction of dunes and sandy ridges, and increase the risk of coastal erosion (AGB, 2011). However, the promised coastal management plans set to follow these changes have not yet being implemented.

When Neodevelopmentism meets global capital: the collapse of the EBX Group delivers CISPA to global investment funds

The limits of the hybrid nature of Neodevelopmentism were tested with lack of liquidity of some the “national champions” between 2011 and 2014. The inability to pay for bank loans and bonus led to acute crisis in several corporations favored by Brazilian state. However, no case was more symbolic than the rapid disintegration of the corporate empire of Eike Batista, the controller of the EBX Group. In 2012, Mr. Batista was the richest Brazilian and Forbes Magazine listed him as 7th richest man in the world¹⁵. However, his situation started to unravel in the middle of 2012 when most of his projects could become operational, the CISPA included.

The situation of Eike Batista and the EBX Group worsened in the beginning of 2013 because of the expiration of bank loans and bonus of several “X” companies. The response of the Brazilian government was, instead of coming to the rescue, to indicate that the market would be seal the fate of Mr. Batista and the EBX Group. Confronted with a combination of overdue loans and bonuses, and loss

¹⁴ See <http://www.odiariodecampos.com.br/avanco-do-mar-prejudica-captacao-de-agua-13583.html>.

¹⁵ See <http://www.forbes.com/profile/eike-batista/>.

of value of company shares, Eike Batista started to sell most of his shares in the “X” companies.

In the case of LLX Logística, the company in charge of CISPA, the control was transferred to an investment company based in the United States, the EIG Global Partners in October of 2013¹⁶. After the transference was completed, LLX Logística had its name changed to Prumo Logística Global¹⁷. I consider this transference as being especially telling of the complicated nature of Neodevelopmentism. Not only because the control of LLX was transferred to an investment fund, but also its headquarters are located in Washington DC. To add another element to the oddity of the situation, Eike Batista recently transferred his remaining shares of Prumo Logística to buy his debts with the Mubadala Fund, a fund established and owned by the government of Abu Dhabi. This move by Mr. Batista concludes the denationalization of Prumo Logística and, by extension, of CISPA.

However, the denationalization process did not preclude the delivery of news loans from BNDES. In fact, Prumo Logística has received a bridge loan of US \$ 0.9 billion for the conclusion of the Açú Port and, as a result, it became the main beneficiary of loans given by BNDES in 2014. In its official website, BNDES (2014) states that:

“This loan is for a set of investments that will allow port works to continue in the municipality of São João da Barra, in Rio de Janeiro. Standing apart in these investments are basic infrastructure works, civil works relating to hydraulic landfill, dredging of internal channels, access and construction of a breakwater for terminals 1 and 2 (T1 and T2). T1 will be used to handle oil taken from the Campos Basin, as well as iron ore. T2, a so-called onshore terminal, will house industries and businesses moving different types of cargo. The aim of the bridge loan is to allow the company to make initial investments required for the project, while the BNDES analyzes the structuring of the long-term operation.”

In light of what I have already presented, the explanation given for this loan is particularly odd given that most of these activities have been publicized as being already completed. Nevertheless, the main oddity seems to be the fact the loan

¹⁶ See <http://economia.terra.com.br/grupo-eig-assume-controle-da-llx-de-eike-batista-na-segunda-feira,8c76bea2374a1410VgnVCM5000009ccceb0aRCRD.html>.

¹⁷ See <http://www.prumologistica.com.br/pt/Paginas/default.aspx>.

was given in the first place. However, it may make complete sense if analyzed under the logic of Neodevelopmentalism. This is especially true if we add to this equation the fact the CISPAs, as part of the export-led growth sought by Neodevelopmentism, was designed to facilitate the flow of commodities (mostly mineral) to global markets with an emphasis in Chinese and Indian markets.

Preliminary conclusions

The primary goal of this paper was not to make a final judgment of Neodevelopmentalism because I am aware this is still an unfolding phenomenon with many facets that have not been theoretical or empirically addressed. The main goal was to address the social, economic and social impacts of the Neodevelopmentalism agenda at the micro-scale. I made this option because of the persistence of most authors to address the theoretical and applied implications of Neodevelopmentalism from the national and global scales (i.e., the Nation-state scale) and almost uniquely from a Political Economy point of view. Although I see the dominant approach was necessary, the use of micro-scale approach could also be important to improve the existing knowledge of how public policies and projects are affecting the main intended beneficiaries of the economic growth sought by governments of president Lula and Dilma Rousseff (i.e., the Brazilian poor). In this paper I have shown that the selection of territories using a top-down approach seemed to replicate the old problems created by the “old developmentism” which in many instances included the forced removal of traditional populations and the degradation of the environment (Bunker, 1990).

However, in the specific case of CISPAs, new strategies to forcefully remove hundreds of families from their small farms, using a combination of State coercion and corporate whitewashing that made almost impossible for farmers and their grassroots organizations to mount resistance. These tactics result in a new wave of State-led land rush on territories occupied by the poor. In addition, the weakening of requirements to issue environmental licenses contributed not only to the occurrence of negative impacts but also to a lack of accountability from state and corporations. A third and important element addressed in this paper was the obvious acceptance of global corporations as partners and beneficiaries in

the policies adopted to facilitate the implementation of the Neodevelopmentalism recipes for Brazilian economy growth. This aspect has been used by some critics that point out that Neodevelopmentalism as just a farcical imitation of “old developmentism” (Sampaio Jr., 2012).

Finally, it is important to note that some of the inconsistencies noted around the postulates and the implementation of Neodevelopmentism may be better understood under the analytical propositions set by the late Scottish geographer Neil Smith. In the afterword to the third edition of his seminal work “Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space”, while addressing the crisis of Neoliberalism, Smith predicted that it would not lead to an end of uneven development but to its intensification. My take on Neodevelopmentism that by embracing the free flow of capital and the dependence on commodities to seek economic growth, it contributes to the intensification of social inequalities. The expropriation of territories occupied by the poor becomes a necessity and the regression of environmental legislation becomes an essential part of the political equation required for the practicalities of Neodevelopmentism. This fact may explain why the elements observed in the implementation of CISPA are not the exception, but the rule in the ongoing construction of industrial-port complexes in different parts of Brazil.

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