Beware the ides of March
Julius Caesar act 1, sc.2, 1.18
Shakespeare

Presidentialism in Brazil
Politics and Administration from the Military Regime to the Workers Party Rule

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Introduction

The area of Presidential Studies has not yet achieved its due importance in Brazilian political science: there are few studies of presidencies or of presidents of the republic. This is a true paradox when we take into account the central importance of this, the presidency as an institution, and of the actions of specific presidents, in the Brazilian political system. In the United States, on the other hand, political scientists have given the subject a certain prestige that has translated into an important body of work. Under the umbrella of “Presidential Studies” there are works on political and administrative aspects of the presidency, the role of the president and the vice

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*In memory of my brother Tito.
president, and of first ladies. Some studies focus on leadership traits and the personality of leaders (Neustadt, 1960) while others emphasize the political context that shape presidential actions (Skowronek, 1997, 2007; Rose in Aberbach and Peterson, 2005). Other important American scholars whose work has been incorporated in the theoretical basis for this paper include Aberback, Peterson, Rose (2005), Pfiffner, Moe, Jones (1999), and Walcott, Hult (1995).

This study, as a contribution to filling the gap in research on presidential studies in Brazil, brings a comparative perspective to analysis of dimensions of the executive/legislative relationship during and after the military regime. Changes in the political and administrative nature of the presidency under military and civilian rule are examined, with special emphasis on the relationship with the legislature. The “Gabinete Civil” (Civilian Cabinet) and its successor, the current “Casa Civil” (Chief of Staff’s Office), made of career and appointed public servants, emerge as the reference point for this study because of its central role in the political and administrative process.

The chapter examines changes in the administrative structure and leadership style of the presidency during the military regime, and its effect on the relationship between the administration and the legislature. It also includes a brief comparison of the presidencies after 1985. Because of the central importance of executive power in both the military and the civilian regimes, understanding variations in presidential leadership is essential to understanding how presidential government functions in Brazil. Due to the executive power’s prevalence in Brazilian politics (Hambloch, 2000; Campos, 1994; Viana, 1975) – in both the authoritarian and the democratic regimes – it is essential understand how the presidential system of government functions in Brazil.

In analyzing the cases in this chapter it became evident that, while the political climate has a powerful impact, the presidents’ leadership styles, organizational decisions and political choices also make decisive differences. There are also significant divergences between the military presidents, even though they all had similar educational and professional backgrounds.

The military regime and the international context

Many analysts describe the military regime in power from March 1964 to March 1985 as a single Bureaucratic Authoritarian regime (Skidmore, 1966, 1988, O’Donnell, 1973, Stepan, 1974). But it was not a monolithic period of

2 This study will not take into account the period when the Military Junta governed the country, between August and October 1969.

3 The structural crises that took place in Brazil between 1961-1964, changed contemporary Brazilian political history when it caused the collapse of the populist government of João Goulart (1961-1964). At that time, there was a political, economical and social crisis where the continuous fragmentation of the party system, an unprecedented crisis in authority in the Armed Forces, revolts amongst sergeants, ideological conflicts and, nonetheless, the capacity and style of
time led by a monochromatic succession of presidents (Peixoto, 1986). It is true that certain policies were constants: a focus on the security and development, strong anticommunism and a significant emphasis on conservative modernization (Fausto, 2000). But there were also significant changes in government style and in policy between the five military presidencies. Some of these were brought about by conjunctural changes, others by the presidents’ personalities. There were also significant alterations in the organizational structure of the presidency of the republic that impacted the dynamics of relationships between the executive branch, the legislature, and the bureaucracies.

The world of the 1960s was shaken by global political events, from the Cuban Revolution of 1959 which introduced, with Soviet support, the first socialist regime in Latin America, in a clear challenge to the Monroe Doctrine4, to the intensification of the conflicts in Indochina, to the assassinations of brothers John and Robert Kennedy and of Martin Luther King Jr. United States. Many of the events which took place included the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union to the landing of American astronauts on the moon, to the countercultural revolution epitomized by the Woodstock festival, the miniskirt and the sexual revolution, to the feminist revolt. In addition, there was the Cultural Revolution in China and the construction of the Berlin Wall in the height of the Cold War.

South America was not immune to these profound changes. In part as a reaction to the Cuban Revolution, and in the context of a kind of ‘international civil war’, military regimes took over in Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Chile and Uruguay. All these new regimes acted as allies of the United States against Soviet ideological expansion. In other words, “South Americanizing” the ideological and military Cold War that pitted the two world superpowers of the time against one another. The new political reality that emerged from this global context marked the region for almost three decades.

**Continuity and Change in the Brazilian Presidency.**

Even during the most authoritarian of the Brazilian military presidencies, the regime continued to be concerned about its popularity with the general public and with the legislature as it was a type of ‘soft’ authoritarianism, different from the ‘hard’ regimes in Chile and Argentina.

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President’s Goulart leadership eroded his legitimacy as President. These were the determining factors for the rupture in the regime. Furthermore, these domestic factors when allied to the international situation, summarized by the Cold War, also contributed to the situation that led the military to seize power, not as “moderators” as they had done before, but as “leaders”, for the first time in the twentieth century.

4 The Monroe Doctrine was a US foreign policy regarding Latin American countries in the early 19th century. The full document of the Monroe Doctrine is long and couched in diplomatic language, but its essence is expressed in two key passages; the first is the introductory statement:

> The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. Source: Monroe, James. "The Monroe Doctrine". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved November 2, 2011.
(1970s), for example. Executive power exercised a clear predominance over legislative power, but this has been the case in all Brazilian regimes: dictatorial, authoritarian or democratic.

From the very first military presidency, that of Castelo Branco from 1964 to 1967, the military maintained channels of communication with Congress. The 1967 constitution formalized a legal apparatus to structure these relationships. When the formal structures proved inadequate, they were supplemented with “Atos Institucionais” (Institutional Acts) and “Atos Complementares” (Complementary Acts). These were intended to maintain what Samuel Huntington as defined as ‘procedural legitimization’.

Instead of taking the blank slate approach to Congress and the Judiciary, as theirs peers in Argentina did during the Junta presided over by General Jorge Rafael Videla (1976) and as was done in General Augusto Pinochet’s Chile (1973), Brazil’s regime opted to reform, maintain and coexist with the institutions. As Huntington (Campos, 1964) observed: “the maintenance of democratic institutions and rites (congress, the judiciary and electoral rotation) characterized the regime as a transitional authoritarianism, facilitating future democratic restoration.”

The administrative and economic modernization implemented with different degrees of success by the military presidencies encompassed basically all activities of the state and society. This brought about successive and profound institutional, political and even organizational changes in the functioning of the state apparatus. All these changes aimed to enable the new political order. The presidency of the republic was not an exception on either the political or the organizational level.

A major change was the strengthening of the powers of Civilian Cabinet (gabinete civil) as it was known at that time. From a supporting role on administrative and political matters for the President, the Minister of the Civilian Cabinet became the highest ranking member of the Executive Office of the President mainly during the PT years. After the Fernando Collor presidency, the post has been known as the Chefe da Casa Civil, usually translated as "chief of staff". Strengthening this post was a way of giving the presidency greater control of a bureaucracy that was challenged by increasingly complex technical issues.

But the moves, be they zigzagging or not, were part of the evolution of government in Brazil. In many ways, they were similar to changes that took place during civilian regimes both before and after the period of military rule.

**The Castello Branco administration (1964-1967)**

The first military government was caught up in a political dilemma represented by the conflict between the new revolutionary order and the desire to keep the formal democratic structure of Congress and the Judiciary working (Campos in Meira Mattos, 1994). This was different from what happened in other violent changes in government in Brazil, 1889, 1930 and
1937 (Trigueiro, in Meira Mattos, 1994). As Roberto Campos observed: “Castello Branco managed to turn the movement into an exercise in institutional modernization and not in another one of the conventional South-American military putschs” (Campos in Meira Mattos, 1994).

This decision required intense political action by the President. Politics, as in every political regime, was the predominant factor in shaping the organization of the regime including the economy, the military and the public administration.

President Castello Branco had many contacts among the political class including his leader in the House, Deputy Pedro Aleixo and his Chief of the Civilian Cabinet, Luís Viana Filho. Castello talked regularly with these leaders to address the most sensitive issues, as well as to guide his supporters in Congress. There were many deputies with high-level legal experience among his supporters in the União Democrática Nacional (UDN), such as Bilac Pinto, Milton Campos and Pedro Aleixo himself. Castelo Branco relied heavily on them for judicial matters.

When the ‘old order’ political parties were replaced by legal changes that imposed a two party system, all these deputies became part of the party that supported the military regime - the Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA).

When choosing his cabinet, Castelo Branco gave the Ministry of Justice to the prestigious jurist Milton Campos. Initially, Campos was reluctant to accept the position, but was convinced by the President’s appeal that his mission was to “re-implement the juridical order” (Viana Filho, 1966).

When he made this obviously technical choice, Castello Branco made it clear that the Chief of the Civilian Cabinet would conduct domestic political matters while diplomat Asdrúbal Ulisséia would be responsible for Congress affairs. This was the initial model put to work by the regime in its relationship with the legislative branch. It should be pointed out that there was another natural liaison for the political and legislative matters in the figure of the Vice President of the Republic, José Maria Alkmin.

The organizational structure of Castello Branco’s administration was established by Law-Decree 200. In that decree the federal government ministries were divided into sectors or areas of competence as follows:

- **Political Sector** – encompassing the Ministries of Justice and International Relations;
- **Government Planning Sector** – Ministry of Planning and General Coordination;
- **Economic Sector** – made up by the Ministries of the Economy, Finance, Transportation, Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, Mines and Energy and the Interior;
- **Social Sector** – made up by the Ministries of Education and Culture, Social Security, Health and Communications.

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5 Law-Decree 200 of the 27th of February of 1967 was the most important legal hallmark edited by the military regime in the field of public administration. In it, it was established the organization of the presidency of the republic and the disposition of the different ministries.
Military Sector – encompassing the Ministries of the Navy, Army and Air Force.

This organization concentrated domestic political activity in the Ministry of Justice while the Chief of the Civilian Cabinet had also the responsibility of advising on all matters of civil administration, including congressional relations. The, Chief of the Civilian Cabinet fitted the role well, having served as a federal deputy for many years. He was also a distinguished journalist and writer, later elected to the Brazilian Academy of Letters. Later on he became Governor and later Senator from the state of Bahia. After Viana Filho’s term, the role of Chief of the Civilian Cabinet continued to be held by politicians and men with extensive political experience.

**The Costa e Silva administration (1967-1969)**

From the beginning, the generals insisted that each of the military presidents give up the office at the end of his legal term. The successor was chosen by the generals, and then formally elected by the Congress. Artur da Costa e Silva was not Castelo Branco’s first choice, but he accepted the collective decision. The structure of government continued, with political matters handled primarily by the Ministry of Justice and the Chief of the Civilian Cabinet’s office. The Chief of the Civilian Cabinet was a deputy from Minas Gerais, Rondon Pacheco, while the Minister of Justice was jurist Luís Antônio da Gama e Silva.

Gama e Silva was a professor at the University of São Paulo, and had served as Chair of the Law School. Rondon Pacheco had been extensively involved in economic development activities in the state of Minas Gerais.

Pacheco was primarily responsible for political relationships in Congress, while Gama e Silva supervised the development of legislation as well as Institutional Acts that did not go through Congress.

The Military Cabinet was in exclusive charge of military matters. It had the important function of maintaining a dialogue with the military ministers and acting as a bridge between them and the president. General Jayme Portela, head of the Military Cabinet was responsible for this area and its issues.

In the political front, Deputy Rondon Pacheco worked silently – ‘in true Minas style’ – in other words, discreetly and skillfully, but intensely on the political issues, linking the presidency to Congress and other political actors as aptly pointed out in interviews by Coronel Sérgio Mário Pasquali, the then Special Advisor for Public Relations in the Presidency of the Republic.

Almost like a ‘jack of all trades’ of the field, the skillful politician and future governor of Minas Gerais had his hands full dealing with a loaded political environment due to social unrest of the period and the President’s wish to have Congress enact a new Constitution. This ended up not happening due to the worsening of the political situation brought about by strong opposition to the regime from the student movement and from the opposition within Congress.
What became known as “the Constitution of 1967” was almost imposed directly by the military upon Congress. The 1967 Constitution gave the Vice-President the role of President of the Senate. A civilian politician, Pedro Aleixo, was invested in that position. This could have provided a mechanism for regularizing the relationships between the presidency and the legislative branch. But opposition to the military regime was growing especially among university students. There was a massive protest march when a student was killed in a confrontation with the police in 1968. A federal deputy, Márcio de Moreira Alves, advocated that young women should refuse to dance with military cadets in protest of the military dictatorship. The military took this as an insult to their honor and asked Congress to prosecute the deputy. But Congress refused, even though it was dominated by the pro-military party.

In response, Costa e Silva called the National Security Council and imposed the Institutional Act Number 5 (known as AI-5), which established stronger authoritarian rule, including giving the president the right to summarily close Congress or any state legislature and to rule by decree. Congress was sent home.

General Costa e Silva suffered a cerebral thrombosis and was relieved of his presidential duties in August, 1969. According to the constitution the Vice President should have assumed power, but the generals overruled this provision and imposed a temporary Military Junta. This junta took the opportunity to further modify the constitution with institutional acts providing disciplinary measures for controlling legislators and civil servants. The “political sector” was abolished as a grouping of ministries. The Military Junta of 1969 enacted Constitutional Amendment N. 1, which revoked the vice president’s dual role of president of the Senate. This feature was retained by succeeding military governments. Under that period (Junta) the executive-legislative relations were practically inexisten.

**The Médici Administration (1969-1974)**

After a short period (59 days) of rule by the Military Junta, the Congress was called back in October 1969 to ratify the military’s choice for the next regular president, General Emílio Garrastazu Médici. The intention was to continue the policies of the Costa e Silva administration. Jarbas Passarinho, who served as Minister of Labor and Minister of Education in the Médici administration affirms that “The Médici and Costa e Silva administrations were the same.”

President Médici believed in delegating and saw himself as the highest arbiter of the Republic. He proceeded to establish an informal tripod of ministers to coordinate the government’s strategic fields: politics (João Leitão de Abreu, Chief of the Civil Cabinet); economics (Delfim Neto, Minister of the Economy); and military and fight against subversion (General Orlando Geisel, Minister of

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6 The political framework of the regime was very much influenced by France’s V Republic. As well as by De Gaulle’s personal style of governorship.
the Army). Médici kept to himself the responsibility to act as the coordinator and moderator of the most important government decisions. Even though he delegated these areas to the respective ministers, the President was personally engaged in many political issues including selecting government party candidates in key state elections such as the he 1970 election in the state of Guanabara (now Rio de Janeiro). In São Paulo, he exercised his influence in order to assure that his favorite, Paulo Maluf and not Laudo Natel controlled the party. He also participated actively in setting the government’s strategies in the fight against the guerrillas. Furthermore, he kept an active dialog with Tancredo Neves, when the latter was still a Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) Senator (Scartezini, 1985).

Political activities were concentrated more and more in the office of the president rather than the Ministry of Justice as had been intended in the administrative reform under President Castelo Branco. This process of concentrating power in the president’s office had begun in the Costa e Silva administration when Rondon Pacheco was chief of staff. While the Vice President was no longer also the president of the Senate, the military valued “procedural legitimation” and maintained close channels of political dialog with Congress. This was facilitated by the government party’s (ARENA’s) overwhelming victory in the 1970 election, thanks again to the optimism generated by the “Brazilian miracle.” ARENA’s victory was so strong that the opposition party (MDB) even considered self-dissolution. The government’s party elected 40 senators against 4 of by the opposition and 223 federal deputies against 87 by the opposition (Scartezini, 1985).

The Geisel Administration (1974-1979)

The next military president, General Ernesto Geisel, had a more difficult economic environment because of the end of the “Brazilian miracle” with the global oil shock beginning in 1973. The armed resistance had been defeated, and the military decided to gradually relax the repressive measures and begin a “democratic opening.” This process was to be guided by three adjectives: ‘Slow, Gradual and Secure.’ Relationships with Congress became more complex and difficult as the strength of the opposition grew. For chief of staff, Geisel chose a military man and old friend, General Golbery do Couto e Silva⁷, who was given extensive responsibilities. In the Ministry of Justice, which would conduct not by himself the political decompression, he opted for a politician, Armando Falcão instead of a jurist, as had his predecessor. Falcão focused on political tasks in the Ministry. Heitor Aquino, private secretary to the President, undertook political assignments that many times went beyond his job description. It was a period of intense political activity, led by the president’s office, the Chief of the Civilian Cabinet and the Ministry of Justice, but also extending throughout the government. The Geisel

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⁷ Probably the most political man among the military.
The presidency was the most political of the military presidencies as it built the understandings with the Congressional leadership that made the democratic opening possible. Geisel was deeply committed to the opening, promoting gradual restoration of democratic principles such as freedom of press.

**The Figueiredo Administration (1979-1985)**

President João Figueiredo pushed forward with vigor and determination the political opening started by the Geisel administration. Following ample negotiations between government and civil society, an Amnesty Law was proposed by the presidency and approved by Congress at the beginning of the Figueiredo administration. It did for Brazilian society a kind of what the Moncloa Pact did for Spain in its transition back to democracy from the Franco dictatorship. Much of the negotiation was managed by the Ministry of Justice, headed by Senator Petrônio Portela. Then Deputy and later Senator Marco Maciel aptly conducted negotiations with the opposition and representatives from civil society. They consolidated the democratic opening, leading to a *grand finale* that was the pacific transition to democracy in which the candidate from the opposition – Tancredo Neves – was elected president of the republic.

President Figueiredo chose to maintain a distance from politicians and political activity, relying on a large number of intermediaries. According to an interview given to this author by *O Globo* reporter Aluísio Raimundo de Carvalho, key intermediaries were: the Head of the Civilian Cabinet, General Golbery, the main coordinator of the group; the Minister of Justice Petrônio Portela; the Vice-President of the Republic Aureliano Chaves; the President's Private Secretary Heitor de Aquino; and the leaders of Government in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, Nelson Marchezan and Jarbas Passarinho, respectively. One should point out the perfect mesh between Golbery and Portela, who worked very well together in many issues regarding the process of opening and reestablishing democratic norm.

On the other hand, at times, the Minister in charge of Social Communication, Said Farhat, overstepped his role and involved himself in political matters. This led to a continuous tension in the relationship between Farhat and the presidential staff, as well as with Figueiredo himself, which led to his firing in December 1980 and even the closing of the ministry he headed.

The political structure was modified with an electoral reform that allowed the return of multiple parties to replace the two-party system imposed in the early days of military rule. The amnesty allowed the return of many political leaders, and the multiparty system allowed them to organize their own alliances. Direct elections for the governorship of key states were permitted in 1982, and opposition leaders won in key states: Tancredo Neves (PMDB - Party of the Democratic Brazilian Movement) in Minas Gerais; Leonel Brizola
There was also a great deal of informal political negotiation and behind the scenes interaction. Supporters of the military government engaged in extensive discussions with opposition figures and supporters. In an interview with the author, General Armando Luiz Malan, Special Advisor to the President, declared he met “off the record,” with many politicians from the opposition who wished to meet with the President or request something from the presidency.

**Political and Policy Differences between Military Presidencies.**

In the first three military presidencies (Castello Branco, Costa e Silva and Médici) political actions were concentrated in the presidency of the republic, more specifically in the office of the Chief of the Civilian Cabinet. In the Geisel administration, responding to a new political moment, the Ministry of Justice regained its political function. Figueiredo maintained this new institutional design for the same reasons, the decision to respond to societal demands for a democratic opening and return to civilian government.

There were also significant differences in economic philosophy. Early in the period of military rule, the team of Roberto Campos (Minister of Planning for Castelo Branco) and Otávio Bulhões (Finance Minister for Castelo Branco) based their actions on economic theories ideologically sustained by liberalism. Later on, Mário Henrique Simonsen (Finance Minister for Geisel and Planning Minister for Figueiredo) and Reis Velloso (Planning Minister from 1969-1979) gave emphasis to national development, or autonomous development, with greater emphasis on state intervention in the economy. Of course all of them did not exclude foreign investment, as long as it contributed to development and the overcoming of economic challenges, especially those brought forth by the oil crisis.

A similar shift happened in the foreign policy of both Presidents. While Castello Branco had an almost automatic alignment with the United States of America, Geisel’s administration imposed responsible pragmatism. The latter was more like the “independent foreign policy” attempted by João Goulart and Jânio Quadros (1961-1963). It had as a main vector the approximation with African countries, especially those of Portuguese language.

It is worth pointing out that Brazil was the first country to recognize the independence of Angola (1975), even though it was proclaimed by the Marxist oriented MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). This was a pragmatic strategic decision that continues to bring Brazil the benefit of a close relationship and economic, political and cultural ties with the prosperous friendly African nation.
The Return to Civilian Rule

The Sarney Administration (1985-1989), the first of the transition back to civilian democracy, adopted a model of relationship with Congress and politicians similar to that of the military presidencies, although with a multiplication of the actors in charge of negotiations with Congress. In one sense, this was not surprising because José Sarney had been a close congressional ally of the military regime for many years. But he had left the government party, PDS (ex-ARENA), to join the PMDB which was part of the opposition coalition in the election. And, as an accidental president holding the office only because Tancredo Neves died just before his inauguration, he was under pressure to accept opposition demands. The result was a great strengthening of the role of power of the legislative branch relative to that of the presidency, leading to the adoption of the 1988 constitution.

The first true inflexion in the institutional skeleton put in place during the military regime came with the election of President Fernando Collor in 1990. Collor had the legitimacy of having won the first presidential election in 30 years, and his platform promised firm presidential action. One of his first steps was to appoint Bernardo Cabral to the Ministry of Justice. Cabral was a former president of OAB (Order of Attorneys of Brazil) and rapporteur of the 1987 Constitutional Assembly. Later President Collor replaced Cabral with Jarbas Passarinho, a former Minister of Labor, Education and Social Security. In a significant attempt at organizational change, Collor abolished the Civilian Cabinet, replacing it with a General Secretariat of the Presidency but did not change the Military Cabinet. This new organism had a predominately administrative role, playing no institutional role in political issues. However, at the end of his administration when he was in danger of impeachment, Collor re-established the Civilian Cabinet with the purpose of dealing with Congress, changing the name to the Casa Civil (usually translated into English as “chief of staff’s office”). Of course this change was not enough to save Collor’s presidency, but too late. However the name was retained.

After Collor’s impeachment and resignation, Vice President Itamar Franco finished Collor’s term (1992-1995). Franco gave the Casa Civil the essentially political characteristics it had always had when it was called the Gabinete Civil.

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003)\(^8\) gave the Casa Civil essentially technical and administrative functions throughout his presidency. His Chiefs of Staff, Clóvis Carvalho and Pedro Parente, had primarily management backgrounds. During the Cardoso presidency, political issues were usually assigned to Vice-President Marco Maciel and to leaders allied with the administration in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The Lula Administration (2002-2010), by contrast, greatly strengthened the role of the Chief of Staff, to the point where he or she was often viewed as a

\(^8\) President Fernando Henrique Cardoso governed for 8 years, benefiting from a reelection amendment passed, for the first time in the Republic, during his first term.
'Super Minister’ or ‘Prime-Minister’ playing both a political and a management role. Lula’s first Chief of Staff, José Dirceu, was perhaps his closest political collaborator and was widely considered to be a likely successor. When Dirceu was forced to resign because of corruption scandals, he was replaced by the current President of the Republic, Dilma Rousseff\(^9\) (2011-2014). Lula’s Ministers of Justice were mostly jurists, although Tarso Genro had an important political role in the administration.

**The Dilma Rousseff Administration**

On the First of January of 2011 the first woman ever was sworn in as President of the Republic of Brazil. Elected thanks to the unconditional support of outgoing President Lula, Dilma Rousseff took advantage of her former boss and leader’s widespread popularity. Lula left the government with an approval rating of about 90%. Those are unprecedented numbers in Brazilian politics, and perhaps even in the world, for a politician at an end of his term. Dilma came to the presidency from the presidential staff, where she served as minister of Mining and Energy and Chief of Staff. She maintained the Chief of Staff’s Office as a ‘true executive-secretariat’ of the federal administration. This was the same role as it had played under José Dirceu, a kind of super-ministry that served to maximize the influence of the President. Once in the Presidency, Dilma chose as former Minister of the Economy Antonio Palocci to succeed her as Chief of Staff. Palocci was a skillful negotiator with great political skills and connections and management skills, as demonstrated during the Lula administration. It did not work out. Palocci resigned in June 2011 engulfed in accusations of influence peddling and muddy ‘consultancies’ during his prior mandate in the Chamber of Deputies. The President replaced Palocci with the Workers Party Senator from Paraná, Gleisi Hoffmann. Her experience was more managerial than political, but she has taken on the strong role as ‘head manager’ of the Brasilia esplanade that Dilma played when she was Chief of Staff. She is even known popularly as ‘Dilma’s Dilma’, even though her situation is not quite the same as Dilma’s was since she was not given the same responsibilities as Dilma and also differs in style. After all, Dilma and her style only moved from one office to another at the Planalto (president’s office). She continues to be a very strong, hands-on manager, exercising power much as a kind of Margaret Thatcher did in Great Britain (1979-1989). The job of maintaining a working relationship with Congress was given to former Senator Ideli Salvatti, who lost her Senate seat in the 2010 election.

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\(^9\) Here forth the Casa Civil acted much more intensely in its management role. Politics was then left to another organism in the Presidency, the Ministry of Institutional Relations.
Conclusions

There have been some significant variations in the structure of relationships between the Presidency and Congress since 1964, but it cannot be said that there was one pattern during the military regime and another during the New Republic Regime. Rather, the structure changed during both the Military Regime and the New Republic Regime reflecting the preferred style of the President and the political circumstances of the time. There was an alternation between more and less centralizing administrative patterns during both the Military Regime and the New Republic regime.

The body most affected by these changes in structure was the Chief of Staff’s office (known at various times as the Civil Cabinet, the General Secretariat of the Presidency, and the Civil House). At times, it played a predominately administrative role with political functions residing in the Ministry of Justice, the Vice President’s office, the Ministry of Institutional Relations, or with the leadership of the parties allied with the administration. Beginning with the Lula administration it became a kind of General Secretariat of the ‘Esplanade’ (the avenue of top government offices in Brasilia), engaged in all and everything. It controls, interferes and intervenes in all areas and all the ministries. This was most noticeable during Lula’s two presidential terms, when the Chief of Staff was José Dirceu and then Dilma Rousseff. This happened largely because Lula was not interested in the day-to-day issues of managing government, and preferred to focus on politics, public relations and policy issues. With the election of President Dilma Rousseff in 2010, the omnipresence of the Chief of Staff’s office declined due to Rousseff’s hands-on management style.

In an apparent paradox, the centralizing and interventionist characteristic of the Palacio do Planalto (the president’s office) intensified under ‘petista’ (Workers Party) presidents. That is true especially when compared to the military regime, which had an administrative structure that followed the decentralizing principles from the Law-Decree 200. The Presidency was then viewed as an administratively ‘lean’ institution, although tough politically. During the Military Regime the Presidents of the Republic participated, intervened, persuaded and influenced political actors and process in order to reach their political goals. They were very much political actors. This may be because they had limited terms of office and had to maintain the institutional framework. This differs from what happened in Chile and Argentina where power was concentrated in a single dominant general.

The presidency was perhaps at its weakest during the Sarney administration, due to his being an accidental president whose background was a poor fit for the climate of his times. This led to a strengthening of the role of the Congress.

President Collor de Mello tried to strengthen the role of the presidency, but was swept out of office as the newly empowered Congress responded to
popular outrage over corruption. President Itamar Franco restored the prestige and legitimacy of the presidency. The civilian presidency as an institution was strengthened during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula de Silva and Dilma Rousseff administrations, although the administrative mechanisms changed. These variations reflected the preferences of each president, and of the individuals he or she chose to put in particular roles. As well as the changes that occurred in the political context.

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Source: table prepared by the author.
**Glossary**

ARENA – Political Party. Aliança Renovadora Nacional – National Renewal Alliance

MDB – Political Party. Movimento Democrático Brasileiro – Brazilian Democratic Movement

PDS – Political Party. Partido Democrático Social – Social Democratic Party (ARENA’s successor)

PMDB – Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro – Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (MDB’s successor)

PRN – Partido da Reconstrução Nacional – National Reconstruction Party

PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores – Worker’s Party

PSDB – Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – Brazilian Social Democracy’s Party

PDT – Partido Democrático Trabalhista – Democratic Labor Party

PFL – Partido da Frente Liberal – Liberal Front Party (current DEM – Democratas)

UDN – União Democrática Nacional – National Democratic Union

MPLA – Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola – People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola

OAB – Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil – Order of Attorneys of Brazil

ABERTURA – (Opening) Process of political opening undertaken by the military regime especially from the Geisel administration on

ALIANÇA DEMOCRÁTICA – (Democratic Alliance) – Coalition that made possible, in 1984, the indirect election of Tancredo Neves through the Electoral College and that lend its name to the first post-64 civilian government.
NOTES:

List of interviews conducted between 2011 and 2013


Armando Luiz Malan de Paiva Chaves. Army General, former Head of the Special Advisory to the Presidency of the Republic.

Aluíso Raimundo de Carvalho. Reporter at O Globo newspaper.

Sergio Mário Pasquali. Army Colonel, former Adviser at the Public Relations Office of the Presidency of the Republic and General Secretary at the minister of Education during João Figueiredo’s administration.