Conference Paper

**Brazilian Studies Association**
University of Illinois - Champaign Urbana, Illinois
September 6 - 9, 2012.

*International Relations in Portuguese: Brazil and the CPLP*

**Joseph C. Marques**

Brazil Institute, Kings College, London
joseph.marques@kcl.ac.uk

Panel INT 8402  Domestic Policy and International Relations in 21st Century Brazil

Friday, September 7, 9:00 - 10:45

Working Draft – please do not quote or circulate without author’s permission.

Comments Welcome
Abstract

Much has been written about Brazil’s ambitious policy of international re-insertion and its active leadership in Mercosul, BRICS and IBSA. This paper looks at Brazil’s role in yet another organization, the CPLP – the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. While some early analysts limited their expectations of Brazil’s role in this organization to the promotion and defense of the Portuguese language and common cultural heritage others argue that Brazil has a unique opportunity to further project its international power and influence through the CPLP.

This preliminary paper is part of a recently launched and wider research project examining Brazil’s role in the CPLP and especially its relationship with Portugal and Angola. The project includes a survey to be distributed to a sample population of economic leaders and opinion makers in Brazil, Portugal and Angola. This first draft identifies several important issues regarding the overall potential of the CPLP as well as several important challenges and opportunities for Brazil’s leadership regarding the group’s three main objectives: 1) promotion and defense of the Portuguese language; 2) economic and technical cooperation; and 3) political and diplomatic coordination.

Key Words: CPLP, Brazil, Portugal, Angola
Introduction

The CPLP – Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries has just recently held its 9th Summit of Heads of State in Luanda, Angola (July 2012). Brazil is a founding member, together with Portugal, and is considered one of the main drivers behind the creation of the CPLP in 1996. As a dynamic rising power with multiple memberships in new international organizations (i.e. Mercosul, BRICS and IBSA), Brazil has yet to decide on the overall importance of the CPLP in its ambitious foreign policy agenda. The fact that the two principal architects of Brazil’s involvement in the creation of the CPLP – President Itamar Franco and Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal (and former Minister of Culture) Jose Aparecido de Oliveira – did not belong to Brazil’s prestigious diplomatic corps may explain the indifference or lack of unambiguous enthusiasm exhibited over the years by Brazil’s diplomatic leaders. While cognizant of possible benefits in the future Brazil has appeared content, to date, to limit its involvement and ambition to whatever benefits might result from the promotion of the Portuguese language and its shared cultural heritage, and, more recently, from its program of technical assistance in the form of transfer of social technologies to countries in need, mainly in Africa.

Missing, however, has been a grand strategy and clear leadership vocation to promote Brazil’s role in this multi-continental organization which has the potential of further projecting Brazil’s growing visibility and influence on the world stage. Broadly speaking, the CPLP presents Brazil with another opportunity (post Mercosul, BRICS and IBSA) to enhance its international leadership credentials and defend the importance of the Portuguese language, promote its creative and effective model of technical cooperation and buffer its reputation and ability to coordinate the political and diplomatic activity of the group.
This preliminary paper reviews Brazil’s role in the CPLP and outlines benefits and risks of assuming a leadership role in the organization. Questions remain however: what does Brazil expect from the CPLP and why should Brazil invest in the further development of this organization? How can the CPLP evolve from an “ambiguous construct” (Santos 2003) and become recognized as the foremost expression of the prominence of the lusophone group of nations?

Africa

Brazil has a long history of solidarity with Africa and the second largest black population in the world outside of Nigeria. It also shares a vast cultural and linguistic heritage with several countries in Africa. Throughout Brazil’s history of development of economic and social policies, Africa, and especially lusophone Africa has been a preferred partner for bilateral development efforts. More recently, Brazil has made serious attempts to bring Africa closer to its broader South American zone of influence (Mercosul) and extend the concept of a “special relationship” to several African countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Angola).

Many view Brazil’s policy towards Africa as a way to increase its influence in the international system by leveraging its shared heritage and linguistic comparative advantage. Brazil’s commitment to Africa is supported by the rapid increase in diplomatic representation in Africa which took place mainly during the Lula administration (2003 – 2010). Brazil currently maintains 37 embassies and/or permanent missions in Africa (there are 34 African embassies and/or permanent missions in Brasilia).

Most of Brazil’s foreign trade in Africa is dominated by oil and commodities and is concentrated in Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, South Africa and Libya. Brazil has begun to
make use of the many instruments at its disposal to foster closer relations with many fellow developing and emerging partners in development. Brazil’s agricultural research agency – EMBRAPA - has opened an office in Accra, Ghana to oversee its many programs in Africa and facilitate the transfer of some of Brazil’s tropical technology most compatible with African conditions. This is also the result of Brazil’s global leadership in ethanol production and research, and its expertise in cotton, coffee and soybean production.

Brazil has established an experimental cotton farm in Mali under the Cotton-4 project to provide for the transfer of Brazilian technology in order to promote the increase of productivity of the cotton chain in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali and provide continuous research and training as well as support the implementation of sustainable farming in these countries.

Brazil’s export promotion agency, APEX, has opened one of its international business centers in Luanda in Angola to promote greater flow of trade between Brazil and the region. Many of Brazil’s largest multinationals have had a presence in Angola since the country’s independence in 1975 and have diversified into many different lines of business and are among the largest employers in the country.

In 2009, the United Nations Development Program’s International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) based in Brasilia launched the Africa-Brazil Cooperation Program on Social Protection (ABCP) which helps facilitate knowledge transfer on various social policies and programs like conditional cash transfers and health governance (White 2010:233). Many developed nations are also interested in learning more about Brazil’s social programs in order to determine their applicability in many African nations. Much of this visibility is the result of intensive interaction between Brazil and other lusophone countries facilitated by membership in the CPLP.
Sub-Saharan Africa occupies an important place in Brazil’s history and foreign policy. Brazil shares a long history and rich culture with many African nations but especially with the lusophone countries - Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and Guinea Bissau. The level of importance of Africa on a whole to Brazil’s economy and foreign relations has, however, oscillated considerably over the decades. Brazil’s recent drive for greater international visibility and influence has certainly been enhanced by its historic ties to Africa and its recent efforts at strengthening closer political relations with many African countries. It seems to be fortuitous that the “new Africa” – a region undergoing sustained economic growth and political reforms now meets “global Brazil” – a country eager to flex its economic prowess and actively engage with the rest of the world.

This combination, if appropriately managed, shows considerable promise for all partners. Brazil’s main African relations are currently with Nigeria, South Africa and Angola. Relations with Nigeria have centered on the issue of energy and petroleum exploration. Relations with South Africa cover a much wider scope of issues as well as global challenges, especially since the creation of the institutional framework of both IBSA and the BRICS. Both countries are large multiracial nations with a history of uneven economic distribution and social justice and are current booming economies. Angola also shows great potential for a very special relationship as well as substantial economic benefits. Bilateral relations have evolved smoothly while additional potential awaits greater institutional development and synergy through the CPLP.

Brazil’s drive to re-insert itself as an important actor in the international community includes its emerging role as a non-traditional provider of development assistance, especially in areas with which it has had extensive experience and domestic success (poverty reduction, improvements in agriculture, health, education and innovation in renewable energy sources). As a “non-traditional” donor and despite a smaller overall budget than that of other BRICS countries (i.e. China and India), Brazil’s development
cooperation policy is often seen as a modern, creative and cost-efficient way to enhance its role as an increasingly important donor.

Though Brazil currently holds “dual” status as both receiver and donor of development aid its recent economic success has rendered it increasingly ineligible for many types of international assistance. Among the major rising powers, Brazil receives the lowest amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by international donors such as Japan, Germany, France and the U.S., primarily for social needs such as hunger reduction programs (Schlager 2007:4).

Brazil’s long experience with the international assistance regime as a beneficiary of development aid in the past has helped shape its perspective as an emerging donor. Brazil clearly prefers to chart an autonomous approach towards international development cooperation backed by the belief that it is better placed to take into account the beneficiary countries’ perspectives given its experience and having faced many of the same development challenges. Given its historical development and current economic success, Brazil feels an obligation to promote development in other less developed areas of the world. This philosophy is often described as “diplomacy of solidarity” or “diplomacy of generosity” (Ayllon Pino 2007:3).

While most analysts describe Brazilian cooperation efforts as fast growing, they remain, on a relative basis, quite limited. As a leader in South–South cooperation (SSC), Brazil is confident in its ability to offer different forms of cooperation which seem more compatible with other countries’ development experiences similar to its own. Brazil’s official government rhetoric promotes “cooperation” rather than “assistance”. Brazil offers a new approach together with a new vocabulary of development. According to Brazil, SSC should be viewed as an example of solidarity between equals without any attached conditionalities. Much of Brazil’s discourse speaks of cooperation “between”
developing countries since Brazil argues that it still faces many of the same problems as most of the other recipient countries.

Preference for the term cooperation rather than international assistance underlines Brazil’s view of the cooperation process as a two-way knowledge exchange and participatory experience rather than a one-sided gift or loan (Usher 2011:2). Having gone through a long period of economic development itself, Brazil sees the needs of developing countries differently and is apparently more comfortable in the role of “partner” rather than “donor”.

CPLP

After an initial effort at forming an international organization solely for the promotion and defense of the Portuguese language - the International Institute for the Portuguese Language (IILP) - in 1989, the CPLP was finally established in July 1996.

The CPLP was established with three broad objectives:

1. the promotion and defense of the Portuguese language
2. economic and technical cooperation
3. political and diplomatic coordination.

Founding members included Brazil, Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, S. Tome and Principe and Guinea Bissau. East Timor became a full member in 2002. There are also currently 3 associate observers (Senegal, Mauritius and Equatorial Guinea). Initial arguments for the creation of such an organization included the advantages of greater projection of members’ collective interests, greater synergies among the public
and private sectors of the member countries, adoption of best practices in many technical areas and the enhanced visibility of their common language and culture.

On the other hand, significant obstacles remain including geographic dispersion (member countries are located in four different continents), very diverse and uneven socio-economic realities as well as different levels democratic maturity. Since its creation, Brazil and Portugal have alternated as the main drivers of the group though never quite operating simultaneously with the same degree of interest. Sixteen years after its creation it is time to reflect on the group’s achievements and remaining obstacles in order to achieve higher visibility, domestic relevance and economic synergy. Many still argue that there remains a significant lack of mutual knowledge and understanding among the populations of all CPLP members.

Language and Culture

The issue of a shared linguistic and cultural heritage is perhaps the issue where the CPLP has been most effective and where it has earned most of its relative visibility. The main institutional achievement has been the Orthographic Agreement which harmonizes written Portuguese among the member nations.

Much of the groundwork and coordination efforts in this regard has been done by the IILP based in Cape Verde. Portuguese is considered to be the world’s 6th most popular language in the world, spoken by over 250 million people. It is also the most popular language in the South Atlantic region. While the Portuguese language has gained recent attention within UNESCO and other UN agencies, official recognition as one of the official working languages of the UN system remains the top priority for CPLP.
Economic Cooperation

While the promotion of its shared linguistic and cultural background has been the principal activity of CPLP since its founding, economic and technical cooperation has been the group’s other main activity. Economic and technical cooperation is the area where smaller and less affluent members of CPLP have witnessed early benefits of membership. In this regard, Brazil has played a leading role in facilitating the transfer of many social technologies developed and tested by its own experience and history of social development.

Through the CPLP, Brazil has developed a leading role in providing technical cooperation and transferring specific social technology to its neighbors in Mercosul, Latin America and Africa especially its lusophone partners. There has been a substantial increase in Brazil – PALOP (Portuguese speaking African countries) cooperation following the establishment of CPLP which has become an important communication channel facilitating an ambitious multi-continental dialogue (CPLP has member countries from Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia).

The PALOP countries currently receive approximately 55% of all Brazilian technical cooperation. All five African lusophone countries have ongoing projects involving agriculture and vocational education, the two most popular project themes. Though most cooperation projects are centered on education, health and agriculture, the complete list of project areas is quite vast and includes alternative energies, public administration reform, the environment, security and defense, etc.

Brazil’s foreign policy has always had the country’s national economic development as one of its main objectives. The country now seems confident enough to use its foreign policy to influence economic development beyond its borders. The country’s impressive
growth over the last decade has fostered an ambitious international development agenda backed by its specialized foreign policy bureaucracy. These efforts illustrate the full expression of Brazil’s growing international stature and emergence as a forceful advocate of the global South.

Brazil has opted to pursue a South–South policy known as “horizontal cooperation” – whereby cooperation is regarded as a form of solidarity between equals. In doing so, Brazil rejects the hierarchal relationship suggested by the traditional donors (OECD) and emphasizes the idea of a mutually beneficial “partnership” between parties.

While Brazil offers several different types of development assistance, it has concentrated its efforts on the provision of technical cooperation. Technical cooperation is defined as the “transfer, adaptation or facilitation of ideas, knowledge, technologies and skills to foster development” (Cabral 2010: 2). Brazil regards technical cooperation as a strategic choice and one of the pillars of its ambitious foreign policy.

As a “partner” in the development process, Brazil proposes development strategies and policies built around the notion of shared efforts and benefits. Drawing from a rich collection of technical know-how and creative solutions to common problems, Brazil strives to strengthen both the human and institutional resources of recipient countries. This is done specifically through the provision of consulting services, apprenticeship training and the donation of technical equipment.

Brazil’s technical cooperation is guided by solidarity principles and aims to be free of political or commercial interests. Many see this as a form of the country’s “soft power”, a way to project power, gain visibility, expand influence and strengthen its leadership role in the global South. In fact, Brazil’s trade with many of the recipients of its development assistance has increased significantly over the last few years. While Brazil concentrates most of its aid to Latin America and Africa, it is the group of Portuguese-speaking
countries in Africa which benefit the most from Brazil’s generosity either through bilateral arrangements or through the CPLP.

Brazil’s relative success with social development programs in its own country has made it a primary exporter of “social technology” to other developing countries. By transferring knowledge, experts and best practices, Brazil has pursued a different approach as compared to China and India which both favor cash disbursements with several types of conditionalities attached to their aid (White 2010:229).

Technical cooperation has been an effective instrument of Brazilian foreign policy, especially regarding the lusophone countries in Africa which have similar tropical challenges thus creating new opportunities for political, social and economic cooperation. Brazil’s actions underlie its philosophy of contributing to global development as an expression of its international solidarity and not as a business partner interested in the recipient country solely as a source of natural resources or simply another vote in its quest for a seat on the UN Security Council.

Brazil’s main objective is to promote successful strategies and technologies with a proven track record in areas such as agriculture (research and innovation, renewable fuels, etc.), health (antiretroviral medicines, milk banks, etc.) and education (vocational education, capacity building capability in public administration, etc.). The major government agencies working with Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) in these areas and most responsible for the execution of the main cooperation agreements are **EMBRAPA** (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation), **FIOCRUZ** (National Health Research Institute), **SENAI** (National Service for Industrial Apprenticeship) and **SEBRAE** (the country’s specialized agency for small and medium sized companies). The country’s development bank, **BNDES**, also plays an increasingly important role as well.
Brazil’s technical cooperation exists in bi-lateral, tri-lateral and multilateral formats. The country’s aid architecture consists of several forms of assistance:
- Technical, scientific and technological assistance with the aim of strengthening technical skills, knowledge and techniques;
- Humanitarian/Emergency Assistance;
- Contributions to international organizations and regional banks;
- Peacekeeping operations (Angola, Timor, Haiti, etc.);
- Educational scholarships (including support for UNILAB–University for the International Integration of Afro–Brazilian Lusophony) and for training of African diplomats at Brazil’s diplomatic academy (Instituto Rio Branco);
- Financial aid: debt forgiveness, concessional loans and export credit lines. Brazil has helped reduce the outstanding debts of several African countries held by the Brazilian Treasury such as Mozambique ($369 million) and Guinea Bissau ($5 million). Brazil also offers soft loans to several African countries (i.e. Angola, Guinea Bissau). Brazil is a main contributor to the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank’s lender of “soft”- more attractively priced loans (Ayllon Pino 2010: 4);
- Trade preferences such as the elimination of trade barriers.

Most of Brazil’s aid is channeled multilaterally with 76% of Brazil’s total assistance going to multilateral institutions. 24% goes to bilateral partnerships (known as SSC) or with a traditional donor partner (trilateral cooperation). According to Cabral (2010:8), Brazil is “currently one of the world’s top participants in trilateral cooperation”. Main partners for triangular cooperation are Japan, Germany, United States, Canada, Spain, France and Italy and UNDP (United Nations Development Program). Working under multilateral organizations also confers legitimacy to Brazilian technical cooperation projects.

The role of the national development bank, BNDES, is potentially of great importance going forward. Given its size and enormous resources, BNDES has the capability of
becoming a formidable driver of international development assistance. Its role and relevance, however, warrant a comprehensive review of Brazil’s cooperation policy since the Bank’s loans require conditional features such as the repayment of loans and the purchase of Brazilian goods and services.

Brazil’s technical cooperation efforts are formally coordinated by the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC) which was established in 1987 and is currently a part of the Foreign Ministry (hereinafter referred to as MRE). ABC’s role is to negotiate, promote and monitor development projects and serve as a subsidiary financing agency. As the main coordinating body, ABC works with many different institutions given the country’s tradition of “parallel diplomacy” whereby many ministries pursue their own international cooperation agenda. MRE’s main partners include the Ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture, Science and Technology, Social Development, federal, state and municipal agencies, NGOs, churches, etc.

ABC has identified the following areas as priorities for its technical cooperation:

1. commitments determined by the President or the Foreign Minister
2. South America;
3. Haiti;
4. African countries, especially Portuguese-speaking countries including East Timor;
5. remaining countries in Latin America and Caribbean;
6. support for the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP);
7. triangular cooperation with developed countries and international organizations.

Disbursement of aid is also divided generally among agriculture (22.6%), health (16.6%) and education (12.6%). According to Ayllon Pino (2010:6) Africa received the majority of Brazil’s aid (50%) of which lusophone Africa received 78%. Lusophone recipients in Africa rank as follows: Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and
Angola. The CPLP has contributed significantly towards Brazil’s reputation as an emerging source of effective technical cooperation.

Besides working with other donors on a trilateral basis, Brazil has expanded its cooperation effectiveness by leveraging its affiliation with many of the other forums where it is a member. In IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa forum), Brazil has been able to direct some funds to Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde for projects in agriculture, health and waste treatment. IBSA has also undertaken a range of development projects across other countries in Africa through the IBSA Facility for Development fund and has facilitated trilateral development cooperation with South Africa.

**Political Consultation and Diplomatic Coordination**

While the areas of language promotion and economic cooperation offer several confirmed examples of success of CPLP, the area of political consultation and diplomatic coordination has, until recently, lagged behind. After years of relative obscurity many observers believe that the CPLP has regained momentum and visibility over the last two years and especially during Angola's recent presidency. Likely reasons for such increased visibility include the rotating membership of both Brazil and Portugal on the UN Security Council and the emergence of important security issues involving Guinea Bissau and East Timor on the Security Council’s agenda. This high profile for CPLP members continues with Mozambique simultaneously holding the presidency of both the CPLP and the SADC – South African Development Community (of even greater strategic importance, however, was the fact that all five BRICS countries were members of the Security Council in 2011).

CPLP suffers from several inherent problems for any chance of immediate diplomatic boost to its members. In addition to the geographic dispersion of the group spread
throughout four continents, most countries also belong to at least one other major political, economic or regional bloc (i.e. Mercosul, European Union, South African Development Community, etc.). There is also significant economic asymmetry among the members of CPLP, with both advanced economies and democracies such as Brazil and Portugal as well as struggling states such as Guinea Bissau.

CPLP is a growing multilateral diplomatic instrument. The CPLP complements the existing extensive bilateral relations and facilitates consensus building. In addition, it provides an established framework for consultation, interest aggregation and increased cooperation among its members. With stronger leadership and resources the organization could become an effective mechanism to project the group’s interests and concerns onto the world arena.

Despite its limited budget (estimated Euros 2.1 million for 2013) and staff it has expanded its involvement into many different issue areas, mainly by sponsoring and coordinating international meetings covering areas of collective interest such as museum administration, public administration reform, election reform, education, tropical diseases, sports, environment and many more. Below the slow-moving top political/bureaucratic layer there is a nascent level of activity propelled by a growing number of sub-state actors.

In theory, CPLP should be the preferential forum for lusophone countries. In addition to relatively strong bilateral relations among all members of the CPLP, an organization representing the common views and interests of all can allow for even greater projection of their collective opinions and preferences. CPLP has its headquarters in Lisbon and most member countries have a specific ambassador (besides each country’s ambassador to Portugal) assigned to the organization. Many international agencies have observer status (i.e. the UN’s Food and Agriculture organization, FAO has just recently become its newest institutional observer). There is a rotating presidency supported by a technical
secretariat. Every two years there is a summit of heads of state and government and there is a monthly meeting of all Lisbon based representatives which form the Permanent Cooperation Committee (Comite de Consertação Permanente).

The political/diplomatic objective of CPLP is to promote greater interest articulation and the defense of common interests mainly in the major international organizations such as the United Nations, European Union, etc. In over forty cities and capitals around the world there are CPLP “groups” where representatives of the eight member countries meet to share information and discuss common interests. While this arrangement appears to be working in several capitals (New York, Geneva, Lisbon, Brasilia, etc.) in other cities anecdotal evidence suggests that many of these groups operate with less than sufficient leadership and enthusiasm.

Political and diplomatic coordination among member countries can result in successful membership to the Security Council of the United Nations. On several occasions there have been two lusophone countries simultaneously on the exclusive Security Council (one instance of Brazil and Portugal together, another case of Angola and Brazil together). Brazil has served ten times on the Security Council, Portugal has served three times and Angola once. Successful negotiation and coordinated behavior can, in theory, guarantee the continued presence of a lusophone country on the Council with many benefits of such membership flowing to all members. Continuous representation on the council can increase each country’s visibility and, consequently, enhance its own bargaining position.

Such high visibility also boosts each country’s position within its other major political bloc (Brazil in Mercosul, Portugal in the EU, Angola in SADC, etc.) Besides the Security Council, CPLP has also shown unity and consensus on several issue areas such as health (CPLP’s Strategic Plan in Health Cooperation and the ePortuguese project at the World Health Organization) and environment (at Rio+20).
Listed below are several examples of projects either currently being implemented, currently in negotiation and/or already implemented in the five lusophone countries which illustrate the wide range of cooperation activities and types of participating institutions:

**Angola**

Angola is the third most important member of and contributor (approximately Euros 350,000 for 2013 budget) to the CPLP. It has significant economic relations with Portugal and Brazil and is a leading investor in the other PALOP countries. While Angola has increased its visibility within SADC it is through CPLP that it stands to gain most international visibility. During its recent presidency of the CPLP, Angola led the group’s oversight mission to monitor the security situation in Guinea Bissau and led the group’s efforts at developing a common policy regarding the issue of food security.

Projects currently being implemented with the help from Brazil include, among others: curriculum reform, malaria control, reform of the Angolan health system and the Angolan national system of agricultural research.

Brazil’s national development bank – BNDES - has offered a credit line to Angola of $1.7 billion to be used primarily in infrastructure projects – using Brazilian contractors. This pales, however, in comparison with a similar line of credit extended by China currently worth in excess of $4 billion.

One of Brazil’s earliest private sector investors in Angola, construction company Odebrecht, is currently the largest private sector employer in Angola employing 26,000 local people (ADB 2011:6). Together with Sonangol, Angola’s national oil company,
Odebrecht has a $220 million sugar and ethanol project and is also building much of Angola’s water supply infrastructure.

**Mozambique**

Mozambique is the lusophone country with the largest number of agreements with Brazil. Current projects in Mozambique include: the production of antiretroviral drugs, establishment of a regulatory authority for the pharmaceutical sector, renovation of the Cefloma – Machipanda forest, etc.

Brazil’s most visible project in Mozambique is its aid (approximately $21mm) for the construction of the continent's first public factory for anti-retrovirals. Such a high visibility project has led other countries (Benin) to discuss with Brazil the possibility of replicating this project. The largest private sector deal in Mozambique involves Brazil’s largest and the world’s second largest mining company – VALE and its’ $4 billion investment in the Moatize coal project.

In partnership with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), two experimental farms are to be established for the purpose of becoming leading centers dedicated to innovation, research, extension and capacity-building, one concerning the semi-arid environment and the other, the cerrado area.

Working with the U.S., Brazil has also recently agreed on a promising trilateral program on nutrition and food safety with Mozambique worth approximately $1.7 million. This program is expected to be copied in other countries in the region driven largely by Brazil’s growing reputation in the region as a sympathetic provider of relevant social technology.
Cape Verde

Cape Verde is generally viewed as a model of internal stability and good governance. It has a special relationship with the European Union and is an active member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Cape Verde played a special role in promoting the first Brazil – ECOWAS Summit. Such model behavior has led to close relations with Brazil and the pardon of its foreign debt with Brazil (estimated at $3.5 million). Projects currently being implemented include: vocational training institute (IEFP), national school food program, human milk bank and water resource management.

S. Tome

Angola plays a significant role in S. Tome’s economy, especially in the oil sector. The CPLP has also played a key role in overseeing the security situation in S. Tome. Projects currently being implemented include: sustainable development of family agriculture, implementation of the national rural extension program (PRONER), implementation of the national school food program, etc.

Guinea Bissau

The recent turbulent history of Guinea Bissau has, unfortunately, impeded any sustained effort regarding economic development. Brazil has led CPLP efforts at mediating the political conflict in the country together with the African Union and ECOWAS. Guinea Bissau, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and Brazil have recently come together to establish a training center for the country’s security forces for which Brazil’s $3 million contribution will be mainly in the form of technical training by the Brazilian federal police department.
Projects currently being implemented include: support for the strengthening of cashew promotion center, support for the malaria prevention and control program, strengthening and technical capacity-building of health institutions for women and adolescent victims of gender-based violence and health promotion.

**Conclusions**

At this early stage of the research project final conclusions are premature but several lines of inquiry are, nonetheless evident:

**Benefits of CPLP Membership**

The CPLP is clearly the best platform for many members to project their common interests. Is this, however, also true for Brazil or will it prefer to pursue its power projection alone or through other organizations? As the acknowledged economic and political leader of the group, Brazil can expect to benefit from the growing visibility and prestige of the CPLP. It must, however, assume a much more active and decided leadership role within the group and invest more in the institutional enhancement of the organization. To a very large extent, CPLP is but the reflection of the power and level of engagement and influence of all its member countries.

Regarding Africa, Brazil stands a better chance at leveraging its leadership position and limited resources by assuming a greater role in the CPLP. With greater leadership on the part of Brazil, CPLP has the potential to support and project Brazilian aspirations on a much broader level. This is yet another opportunity (besides Mercosul) for Brazil to, show its political maturity and skill in managing a multi-continental group and exhibit its diplomatic prowess as an important new power on the world stage.
CPLP is a growing multilateral diplomatic instrument. The bloc has slowly gained enhanced visibility since its creation sixteen years ago. Recent examples of heightened visibility include the emergence of Brazil’s role as a promoter of technical cooperation to fellow CPLP members, CPLP’s role in managing the crisis in Guinea Bissau, the growing importance of the Portuguese language, the growing strategic importance of the South Atlantic region in economic and security terms, and CPLP’s role in monitoring the recent elections in Angola.

Technical Cooperation

Brazil’s role as an emerging donor of international development cooperation is likely to increase while its role as a recipient of aid will, most likely, decrease in the future assuming the country maintains its current level of economic growth. As an important new player in the field of international assistance, its immediate challenge, however, is to develop greater legitimacy for its cooperation policy and secure the support of an important domestic political constituency at home. To do so, Brazil must promote a wider social debate nationally in favor of this foreign policy objective in order to promote the concept of development cooperation and create a domestic constituency to support the fast growing demand for Brazilian technical cooperation.

Brazil must consolidate its public policy objectives regarding international cooperation in order for it to become more strategic and efficient. There is a need for greater emphasis on specific policy aims. It is no longer appropriate to use the criteria of traditional donors (OECD) to assess and compare the quality of Brazil’s development assistance program. Efforts at technical cooperation not backed by a coherent national strategy will also have a limited effect on the beneficiary countries.
Brazil also has the opportunity to play a leadership role in reforming the international aid architecture. To do so Brazil must participate actively and intermediate between traditional developed members and its fellow emerging donors. To date there has been little input on the part of Brazil on this issue other than reaffirming its reluctance in following recommendations proposed by traditional donors of aid. Despite its reluctance in joining the club of traditional donors, Brazil has participated frequently in triangular programs with OECD countries and it can play a leadership role in charting a compromise between emerging donors and OECD donors regarding objectives and procedures.

Brazil has demonstrated a specific ability to provide cooperation in both an innovative and cost efficient fashion. It must now decide how to take this engagement to a higher level and determine how to consolidate its position between traditional and emerging donors.

Civil Society

The CPLP has not done enough to enlist grassroots participation by elements of civil society in the work of the organization. The CPLP remains a minor international actor and it must allow for much greater participation of civil society actors, determine the resources and opportunities of the wider lusophone economy and improve the overall diplomatic coordination among its members. All CPLP members must make considerable efforts at engaging their civil societies with CPLP. As with other major foreign policy objectives, Brazil’s leaders must reach out to civil society and explain not only what it does but also describe the likely benefits of CPLP membership to countries such as Brazil in search of its role in the international order. The significant lusophone diaspora throughout the world must also be incorporated into future plans of the CPLP.
Political and Diplomatic Coordination

Members must improve their political coordination and mutual support for fellow member throughout the institutional universe of the United Nations. The benefits of continuous representation in the Security Council can significantly improve the capacity to bargain and reinforce members’ influence elsewhere (Brazil in Latin America, Portugal in Europe, etc.). The CPLP can build on its earlier successes and strive towards greater diplomatic coordination. Portugal’s recent election to the Security Council was the result of a dynamic coordination among CPLP’s members and their individual efforts in their regions. Another recent example of such coordination was Angola’s election to the U.N.’s Council on Human Rights in 2010.

Economic Potential

Economic and commercial interaction in the CPLP remains largely untapped when considering the privileged relationships among the members of the group. The first meeting of the group’s trade ministers only took place this year, 16 years after the creation of the group. Brazil, as the main economic powerhouse of the group must lead efforts to better develop the economic synergies among the members. The economic potential of this group is largely unexplored with many more opportunities awaiting greater focus on the bloc’s economic potential.

What is the economic value of a common language and shared cultural heritage? How should member countries coordinate their efforts to identify ways to leverage this economic factor? Several economic clusters have already been identified: knowledge, agriculture, infrastructure, oceans, energy and tourism. There is a growing consensus that the CPLP must shift from a linguistic-cultural orientation to an economic-strategic one.
There is evidence of growing Angolan economic interests in Portugal’s economy, growing Brazilian economic interests in the economies of Angola and Mozambique and so on throughout the organization. It is important to note that any new focus on the economic potential will be done against the backdrop of existing substantial Chinese economic interests in these countries.

The entrepreneurial potential of lusophone diaspora also remains to be explored and incorporated into a wider economic strategy which must include the economic impact of the many immigrant communities in each of these countries (i.e. foreign remittances, entrepreneurial potential, etc.).

Additional Issues of Concern

Significant weaknesses remain to be addressed by the organization’s members: a divergence of interests, weak institutional framework and disparate individual priorities. In the past the CPLP has clearly not been identified as a high priority by many of its members and it has suffered from such political indifference. Brazil’s foreign ministry has not viewed CPLP throughout the years as one of its most important priorities. After sixteen years of existence and highly visible multiple summits, the level of familiarity of the group’s members with one another remains unjustifiably low. The future of the organization depends on a clear commitment on the part of all members and especially its most important member.

Future Institutional Challenges

Looking forward, the CPLP requires bolder objectives in order to move its member countries forward and develop the organization’s reach in the areas of human rights, security, institutional funding (to strengthen secretariat, fund catastrophic assistance, etc.)
and trade and foreign investment. In order to become an effective and powerful international organization the CPLP must expand its mandate (especially in the economic and trade areas), better incorporate the civil societies of all its members and move forcefully forward in promoting the importance of the lusophone community and its place in the international order.
Bibliography


Santos, Luís António (2003).”Portugal and the CPLP: heightened expectations, unfounded disillusions” in Lloyd-Jones, Steward and António Costa Pinto (Eds.), The last empire: 30 years of Portuguese decolonization, Bristol: Intellect/Portuguese Journal of Social Science.


Shiguenoli, Miyamoto, 2009. “O Brasil e a comunidade dos países de língua portuguesa (CPLP)”. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 52, No. 2.
