THE DENATIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION CONCEPTS

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When considering a denationalization for democracy and representation concepts, this paper suggests an exercise to test in an unusual way the subjects in question. In first place, the presentation of studies that privilege the vote while democratic path par excellence, and the difficulties that any distinct option can provoke. Secondly, we will give some examples over the dispute of elections role awaken within the theorists of the representative government, and the difficulty of a standard formula for political representation. Finally, recent attempts to freedom thought of traditional moorings will be presented. The effort to generate an open space of thinking, alternatives inside of current theories of political representation in democratic context, and how such subjects can be formulated in terms of politics in Brazil.

To take predominant naturalness off and get your mind undressed to study political representation and its relation with democracy can be an interesting interlocution to the questions related to the effective functioning of representative democracies. To perceive reasons for which some concepts had simply been adopted in current politics, as it was the case of political representation, in detriment of others. Probably, this is an understanding exercise, less under a true or false criterion, then a successful theory in the disputed field that involves the adoption of any political process or structure.

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The perspective of tense relationship between democracy and representation cannot be analyzed as a recent fact, which emerges nowadays. The conflictive relationship between both concepts is pointed out in different ways by recent authors, but its origins retrace to the own historical process where the model of representative government was established. To denaturalize democracy and political representation require the exactly perception that its relation always was tense and of dispute, and that the consensus, although much desired by some theorists of democracy, is not who gives the final word to the process.

Reinhardt Koselleck was responsible for a pertinent conceptualization to this discussion, he argues: “Por que somente em determinada época certos fenômenos são reunidos em um conceito comum?” (“Why only in a specific time certain phenomena are congregated in a common concept?” KOSELLECK, 2006, p.117). The unisonous that follows the option for political representation as an institutionalized mechanism of the contemporary democratic governments brings in the discussion about the right to vote and the consolidation of elections through universal suffrage as political participation. It could be said that there is voracity to defend the political opinion expressed basically through vote, as for example, Giovani Sartori states: “são opiniões expressas pelos eleitores em geral nas eleições, e somente através de eleições” (They are opinions expressed by electors in general through elections, and only through elections - Sartori, 1987, pp.127).

It can be added, and in fact is a surplus of value, in the same way of the virtuous fallacy of democracy that the strict procedural model of Schumpeter\(^3\) tried to reduce to a simple method, but gave a great outcome with the insertion of the competitive analysis. The subsequent theories of games\(^4\), whose necessary adjustment to participation criterion Robert Dahl tried to organize through his proposal of poliarchy\(^5\), in all these moments the patterns of free and periodic elections had been kept. The right to vote starts to be a choice, or a rational choice\(^6\) as some are going to define it, but indeed it continues to be the path par excellence for popular opinion to express, no matter how

\(^{3}\) The best presentation of this Schumpeterian theory was described in *Capitalismo, Socialismo, Democracia* (1984).

\(^{4}\) For a general analysis on theory of games see Przeworski, Adam. (1992).

\(^{5}\) As considered in Dahl, Robert (1997) in *Poliarquia*.

\(^{6}\) For theory of the rational choice in Brazil see Reis, Bruno (2003).
would be the better way of defining what is definitive for this opinion to consolidate itself.

The evident fact, at last, was that voting heads the discussions concerning all possible democratic political systems. It also appears as a strong argument that many times keeps distant the theorists worried about the analysis of the institutional electoral model⁷, and on the other hand, for example, the partisans of the participatory theory⁸. The question is that the right to vote through universal elections and under the criterion of majority (however the structures may vary on achieving this aim) would be the only viable and legitimate mechanism able to indicate a representative.

Since at least XVII century, the strong attachment to the exercise of voting took an almost religious form, and we insist here on its moral character of defense, in a mystic side of the argument of representative government theorists, to say it in another way, in the example of the American Republic, shaped as enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, to provide security and happiness:

O primeiro princípio de republicanismo é que a lex majoris partis constitui lei fundamental de toda sociedade de indivíduos de iguais direitos; considerar a vontade da sociedade enunciada pela maioria de um único voto tão sagrado como se fosse unânime é a primeira de todas as lições em importância, todavia a última que se aprende exatamente. (Carta a Alexander Humboldt, Monticello, 13 de junho de 1817, Jefferson, 1979, pp. 27)

But, after all, it would be right to expect the representative governments to completely represent the popular sovereignty? And what would be said of the sovereign popular will that always would be guaranteed through the vote? The mention of voting as a sacred defender of the democratic principles is not uncommon. From inside of political speeches, many times such expressions emerge. They are related to a common imaginary, a past that is repeated, revived and ritualized through electoral practice⁹. It was Lévi-Strauss who taught that myths are always related to past events. But the intrinsic value that can be attributed to the myth regards the fact that it occurs in a special moment of time, and hereupon forms a permanent structure. Such structure is

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⁷ For a study on electoral systems in Brazil see Nicolau, Jairo (1999).
⁹ In Brazil, a recent paper of Fernando Lattman-Weltman (2007) suggests a relation of myth and politics, in the ideas of a supposed “crisis of the representation” that would come along the reasoning on contemporary representative models, that in some imagined era before it would have functioned better.
related, simultaneously, to the past, the future and the present. (LÉVI-STRAUSS, 1975, p.238). Thus, it should not sound strange the prescription of political theorists: electoral practice is not enough to guarantee the proper functioning of democracy.

To consider the myth regarding politics, a good option is the one offered by Pierre Vernant (2002). It was not occasionally that reason would have appeared in Greece, as a consequence of an original political institution form called *polis*. It was there, that by the first time in the history of man, a human group considered that its common problems could only be decided, and the decisions of general interest could only be taken in the end of a public and contradictory debate. This debate must be wide open so that different speeches would oppose to each other. If rational thought appeared in places as Mileto, was due to the rules of political game in the city scenes (public debate, freely contradictory), that also became the rules of intellectual game. The important consequence of this analysis is regarding rationalism, the debate notion, of contradictory argumentation, constitutes a basic condition. The rationalism is only possible if it is accepted that all questions, all problems had been open through public and contradictory discussion. It should not be possible that in the name of any given idea anyone pretend to silence the debate at any given time. For Vernant, every time in the modern era when it was intended to deduct a sector of social life from public and contradictory debate, the social groups that were engaged in this action had produced religious thought.

The aim here is to make evident that the conquest of such right, to vote for a representative, was full of superstitions, and as Bernard Manin well described (1995), it is not true that elections are a democratic mechanism par excellence as they appear to be. On the other hand, it also can be emphasized that the revision of possible political participation forms is necessary. Different questionings, such as majority must be faced, and even Sartori already cited here as an election strict defender warns:

*Com o devido respeito pelo slogan da democracia enquanto poder majoritário : é o respeito e a salvaguarda dos direitos da minoria que sustentam a dinâmica e a mecânica da democracia. Em resumo, os direitos da minoria são uma condição necessária ao processo democrático. Se estamos comprometidos com esse processo, então também devemos estar com um poder de maioria restringido e limitado pelos direitos da minoria. Manter a democracia como um processo contínuo requer que asseguremos a todos os cidadãos ( maioria mais minoria) os direitos necessários ao método segundo o qual a democracia funciona.* (Sartori, 1987, pp.56)
What role play elections for political representation concept is a disputed question for the theorists of democracy and representation. Just to give an idea, Nadia Urbinati (2006) develops her narrative on the innate qualities of political representation taking for granted the assertion (and critics) of the analysis from Bernard Manin about representative government mainly concentrated on elections:

Representation plays no substantial role in Manin’s work, whose main goal is to prove this system is not identifiable with democracy...Whereas democracy practices rotation, representative government practices election...(Urbinati, 2006, pp.09)

What Nadia Urbinati aims to avoid is the strong perception of Bernard Manin studies when exploring intensively the distinctive fact that the main character of representative government is the exclusively practice of elections, although their existence per se does not guarantee their democratic character. Manin precisely describes how aristocratic can elections be, however the relation between elected and voters still today is perceived as democratic, when it was conceived, it has been thought as something opposed to the democracy. Such argument states for the consideration that there is a restrictive understanding of representation, which does not allow any additional source of representation beyond the electoral decisions.

The representative government is an eminent phenomenon, that despite an overall concerning that it is well known, can surprise. When we deal with the history of representative government, there is a great range of ideas that somehow have already been shaped as representative proposals. Three clear inversions will be presented here to demonstrate the difficulty regarding the statement of standards concerning the institution of the representative governments. The analysis of these inversions should serve as an alert to the crucial accuracy that opposes the naturalization related to understanding the effectiveness of representation as the ruler mechanism of political process.

The first great inversion deals with the question that representative government, conceived in explicit opposition to democracy, is nowadays presented as one of its forms. About the initial opposition to democracy, innumerable examples can be given. Beyond the ones presented by Manin, there is this part of the federalist, for the American case, for example:
A república aparta-se da democracia em dois pontos essenciais; não só a primeira é mais vasta e muito maior o número de cidadãos, mas os poderes são nela delegados a um pequeno número de indivíduos que o povo escolhe. (Madison, 1979, pp. 98)

Or also Sieyes about the French case:

Um tal razonamiento, que es correcto para las más pequeñas municipalidades, deviene irresistible cuándo se trata de leyes que deben gobernar a veintiséis millones de ciudadanos. Siempre he sostenido que Francia no es, no puede ser, una democracia; así como tanpoco puede convertirse em um Estado federal compuesto de una multitud de Repúblicas unidas por um lazo político cualquiera. (Sieyes, 1990, pp. 118)

It is obvious that the federative option in the United States was due to its previous experience as a colony, and was totally distinct of the fight for the nation joined in France against the oppression of privileges from the old regime, but the fear regarding democracy then, sounds unanimous in the militant speeches. On the other hand, the institutional device that regulates the assignment of the representatives by the represented did not experiment strong changes since its origins.

It still remains a paradox, the linking between elected and voters still today is perceived as democratic, although when it was developed, it has been thought as something also in opposition to democracy. The second inversion that can be described, appears as a consequence of the first one, and belongs precisely to the distance between elected and voters, or representative and represented as preferred by Manin, and the main idea of the distinction principle.

In the history of representative government, lottery was supplanted by elections. Probably that was the case due to lottery does not allow choose for power decision by the ones which will be submitted to it. Lottery, regarding this question, is a procedure for power distribution, not a legitimating one. Elections, on the other hand, serves to select those who rule at the same time legitimizing this power when requiring enrollment and obligation of those chosen.

Very probably, it was such feeling of legitimacy and political obligation that allowed the triumph of election, although an obstacle can be observed. In the origins of representative government, citizens appear in the process of political representation much more as a mere political power attributive (Manin, 1995, pp. 124), and, not or no longer more, as a potential candidate, as any one that could ascend for a political
position. This, in some way, disqualification of citizens’ possibilities in relation to previous democratic experiences, became more evident in the second inversion, that beyond the opposition between democracy and representative government, foresees that the distinction between elected and voters not only exists, but in fact is desirable. Although the hole citizens figure have been widened with universal suffrage, the real possibility of participating some times as governed, and others as governor, became a distant idea.

Manin characterizes the federalist ideas as one of the clearest expositors of these distinguishing criteria. Madison accepted implicitly that the representatives could not resemble the represented. There were some expectations over the elected; they should be different and distinct from the voters, because the republican government would demand, as any another regime, that the political power should be attributed to the ones that embodied the best wisdom and virtue standards. (Manin, 1995, pp.153) Herein an illustration:

*Num tal governo (a república) é mais possível que a vontade pública, expressa pelos representantes do povo, esteja em harmonia com o interesse público do que no caso de ser ela expressa pelo povo mesmo, reunido para esse fim.* (Madison, 1979, pp. 98)

But the main character of the American debates that brings the research of Manin, was the Anti-federalists debate, more favorable to the States autonomy\(^{10}\). When insisting hardly on the similarity and proximity between represented and representatives on a popular government, they had been the first ones to formulate a clear and possible form, of a coherent and strong conception of representation. They accepted without reserves the functional necessity of differentiation between governed and governors, something that never was questioned.

But on the other hand, they supported that if the representative government wanted to impose itself as an authentic popular government form, the representatives would as much as possible be like their voters, take part of their life conditions and be close to them, in both sociological and geographic terms. Such conception, however, was widely struck in 1787. Thus, exactly how from the beginning of the representative government establishment it was not based on similarity nor in proximity principles

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\(^{10}\) Manin uses especially texts of H. Storing (ed.), *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, from where the fragments of political actors as Brutus, Melancton Smith and Samuel Chase (Manin, 1995, pp. 145-150).
between elected and voters. The representatives would not only have to be distinguished of the represented, they should be placed in a higher scale of talents, virtue and wealth. However the similarity ideal had lost the argument with the federalists, it predominated with strong appeals during the nineteen century in occidental politics. There were no doubts, therefore, that elections may have an aristocratic face.

The third and last inversion, also very related to the previous ones, mentions the classic question of the small size as the more propitious to good governments, regarding such extension as population. A well known discussion over this topic was offered by Artistóteles, which illustrates its terms with the ship’s metaphor:

Um navio que fosse do tamanho da cabeça de um dedo, não seria um navio, como tão pouco seria um do tamanho de dois estádios; mas mesmo que atingissem essas dimensões, tanto a demasiada exigüidade como a excessiva grandeza tornariam a navegação defeituosa. (Aristóteles, Política, livro VII, cap. 4, 1326a, 35-40)

Aristotle has dealt with the reasonable size for the *polis*, but he already advised that if it was less numerous, it would not manage to keep its autonomy, and, on the contrary, if it was increasingly numerous, however rich, it would hardly could gain a political form since it would be very difficult to command a so vast multitude. The best size would be the one sufficient to live in a political community, under principles of circularly distribution of power among governed and governors.

Finally, he completes: “It results evident, therefore, that the perfect population limit is the one that does not exceed the necessary amount of individuals to carry on a common self-sufficient life to all.”(Aristóteles, Política, livro VII, cap. 4, 1326b, 20)

But then, one can argue, this author was so distant, in classical antiquity. Therefore, many centuries later there would be an warning of Nicolau Maquiavel, in its *Discorsi* about the same subject:

Acredito que, para estabelecer uma república cuja existência se possa prolongar por muito tempo, o melhor seria organizá-la como Esparta ou Veneza, num local protegido, tornando-a forte o bastante para que ninguém pensasse poder vencê-la.... Se a república se mantiver dentro dos seus limites, se a experiência demonstrar que não dá ouvido à ambição, o medo jamais levará vizinhos a declarar-lhe a guerra. Confiança que será ainda maior se a constituição a proibir de alterar seu limites. Estou seguro de que se este equilíbrio puder ser mantido, teremos a vida coletiva mais perfeita, e a paz mais desejável para uma cidade. (Maquiavel, 1979, pp.39-40)
Maquiavel considered that the necessity that compels men in different times to undertake things that their reason would reject, would rebound weakening the process. Thus, there would be problems however establishing the republic in the more adapted shape in order to keep without conquests. When men are impelled to do so, compelling necessity of growth would drive them to defeat, due to a lack of necessary base.

About Maquiavel also could be said that the author was still in a distant time from the debates over the representative government that took place around 1780, still thus the words of Rousseau would provide some ground to this discussion. In 1757, Jean-Jacques writes *Emilio* and the *Contrato Social*. In the second book the author enumerates:

> Em todo corpo político há um máximo de força que não se deve ultrapassar e do qual o Estado freqüentemente se afasta por muito crescer. Quanto mais se estende o liame social, tanto mais se afrouxa, e em geral um Estado pequeno é proporcionalmente mais forte do que um grande. (Rousseau, 1978, pp.62)

It is not news to say that normally the size of Modern States is invoked to explain the absence of the Assembly of citizens. In this context, appears the impossibility of meeting all citizens at the same time, in one exactly place, to decide and to deliberate. It would be necessary then, that govern remains under a few number of individuals then the citizens’ Assembly. However, history showed that practical impossibility to congregate people in Assembly was not the essential consideration that motivated certain founders of the representative institutions, as Madison or Sieyes (Manin, 1995, pp.13).

But the former diagnosed inversion is something beyond from Manin’s argument that political representation was an option to contain volitions. The fact is that the representative government, and this is more evident in James Madison speeches, was not only described as a second option, but also as the best form to choose, not for the contingency of the great number and confusions only, but as the best form to select the more virtuous, capable and therefore, also richer citizens.

A passage of the famous chapter X of the Federalist, speaks by itself:
Reduz-se, pois, a questão a saber se a grandeza ou pequenez das repúblicas é mais favorável à eleição dos melhores defensores do bem público: duas considerações sem resposta fazem que a decisão seja a favor da primeira. (Madison, 1979, pp.98)

Thus, it is because of the large extension of the Republics, so as in size then as in population, that through the privileged path of political representation will be possible to choose the best ones. Because among a bigger population, certainly there will be a stronger probability of more virtuous citizens, with a biggest universe, of course, the possibilities will be multiplied.

The argument inversion is important and Madison observes that the fact of the an increased number of citizens in a bigger republic, will also bring the advantage of turning it difficult to use “culpable artifices that influence elections at many times; with more freedom for people to vote, the votes will have a greater probability to fall into individuals of recognized merit and character generally esteem” (Madison, 1979, pp.98). It is pointless to mention here the difficulties that such argument offers, since everything that it is adopted until today regarding electoral reforms is exactly objectifying the ideal of neutralizing the manipulations and artifices improperly used in electoral campaigns.¹¹

Finally, with so many advantages, Madison interposed some half term, actually, if the number of electors increased excessively, he stated, they would be badly instructed in local questions. But, in a small republic, the representatives would be with immediate dependence on the represented. Here he brings in the option of a federative government, where general interests are trusted to the national legislature, and particular and local for the states lagilature.

It is important to perceive that nothing prevents that the states themselves, organized in a federal republic, as it is the American case and also the Brazilian case(with a distinguishing description in American case, therefore they had existed as independent constructs before their unifying process¹²). The states could grew in such a way after time, as in fact they had grown, producing some circuitry which such explanation would confirm and explain well, from today existing claims of distance

¹² For an excellent analysis of local experience an organization capacity see Putnam, Robert (1996) Community and democracy.
between representative interests and represented interests. (and it was not even mentioned the contingency of increasingly inequality, as it is the case in Brazil).

But, in the end, the dimension of the Modern State made it impossible an universal participation of all citizens together, at the same time, organized in Assembly to govern. Clearly, this factor probably influenced the establishment of purely representative systems. The dimension of Modern States, however, could not dictate the rejection of lottery. It would be technically possible to select a small number of representatives in an Assembly by lottery. This occurs, for example, in the judiciary when a jury is selected.

Manin makes an effort to show that democratic and aristocratic sides of the democratic process in which governed assigns the representatives can be balanced. The absence of imperative mandates or legal constraints, and also the fact that the representatives cannot be revocable from time to time by the represented grants to the elected certain independence in relation to the voters. On the other hand, the public opinion, a consequence of the representative government metamorphoses in a mass democracy, forms a popular counterpoint to the independence of the elected. At the same time, it is possible to highlight that when the elected are submitted to re-election, it will always be possible that electors manifest a retrospective judgment of representatives' action.

It is undeniable that elections make problematic the democratic desire of keeping the governors seem as any citizen, close to the governed typical characteristics, their way of life and their concerns. But if we consider the citizens, not as potential candidates to be chosen for others, but as citizens that owns a possibility of choice and bearers the right to attribute political positions, elections appear under a distinct optics. Its democratic image emerges, since all citizens have equal possibilities to choose their governors or fire them. Although Manin's justification for the process, according to which elections finish by selecting an elite, but where who decides who will be this elite is the common citizens, closing a medium circle, an important exception remains.

After a careful analysis, it becomes difficult to ignore the distinction principle, and a necessary accuracy would always be considered when dealing with the aristocratic face of elections. The underlying necessities of minimum conditions of citizenship in
order to allow people participation in political decision processes, especially in unequal societies as Brazil, give a strong aristocratic twist to political processes. Try to understand how long the social asymmetry reflects in the political environment, something that may provoke in representative processes the sensation of a necessary democratic expansion, taking a direction to improve the access of most of the population, as it is the case in Brazil, to the political sphere regarding public policies.

To oppose so many alternations diagnosed through the history of representative government, it was reaffirmed a necessity of enumerating some criteria accordingly to which the representative government could be identified. Manin argues that such criteria would be constant, but what may be observed is that they are more democratic safeguard patterns to any government that aims for legitimacy in representation, then constant categories over time. Accordingly to Manin, it would be called representative political governments some places where certain typical institutions were conducted under four principles since that they had been invented: a) the representatives are assigned by regular elections; b) the representatives conserve, in their decisions, certain independence of the voters’ interests; c) the represented can state their opinions and political judgment without being submitted to representatives’ control; and finally, d) the public decisions are submitted to discussion.

It is exactly in relation to item c, considering the freedom of speech, judgment and political opinion without control of the representatives, that we could add a point to Manin’s model, for inclusion and at least legitimacy to discuss participatory proposals. It is not part of Manin’s proposal, he keeps only the increasing importance of the media while debate forum, proposing agendas and a political representative who is not only a voice speaker. He also describes the personalization of electoral choice, that transforms the representative part into a trustee, but also in a relatively independent actor, who constantly searches and discloses social nuances.

The result of a public democracy, as described by Manin, makes evident the necessary accountability of the elected actions, but also the weak capacity of the represented to intervene in the process. The public opinion finishes as the only path. But what if the demands multiplicity is exponential? We can add that in the freedom of speech and political opinions there is a way of participation for all those that consider themselves out of the process for innumerable reasons. Strength these relations between
social demands and politics is a challenge for contemporary societies. An attempt to think these questions of the sovereignty and representation in current mass societies, recent authors as Pierre Rosanvallon (2000), pay attention to the necessity of understanding representation in a more complex way, so that people would have more participation in politics. The great political twist that institutes the representative government, was not only confused, but it was marked by “founding mistakes of representative government”, related to the ambiguous character that marked its conception.

Rosanvallon presents a democratic proposal as an attempt to institute a set of individuals in a community. Instead of cultivating a disenchanted democracy, it would be better to retake political function as a fundamental pattern. A complex sovereignty would be the re-symbolize of democracy, where an untouchable people would be transformed into an active political community. A new conception of the democratic imperative would invite to think about the multiplied character of men emancipation, the sovereignty appears as a multiplier of freedoms and chances, as an opener and not as a limiter.

The different forms of emancipation would also lead to a re-formularization of the politics object. The main political concept would not be will anymore, but justice. It is a passage from a will democracy to an institution democracy, or institutionalized. In this context, the objective would be the organization of common life by regulated distribution of rights and goods between men and women. Its perspective includes the discussion of justice norms and its administration.

Such perspective is to keep as a guideline the experience, experience where the work of denomination and the research of fundaments only can occur through the examination of social and institutional practices. The possibility for the constitution of what could be called as “a democratic theory of democracy” appears in the end of this way. And it is exactly at this point that history and political philosophy find each other. Rosanvallon informs the advent of a new type of notions called “anti-power”, something that the author considers as a step beyond the discussion of Michel Foucault. A type of action that does not search the political power, essentially reactive, where the intention is to collectively structure a proposal of any discontent social segment (Rosanvallon, 2006).
Another contribution to face the problem is presented by Nadia Urbinati, who considers the studies of Rosanvallon as an analysis of the representative democracy as a “regimen of time”, where the vote in favor of a candidate would reflect the *longue durée* and effectiveness of a political opinion or a series of them, also reflecting the attractiveness of a political platform, or a set of demands and ideas throughout the time (Urbinati, 2006, pp.211).

Such argument, however, encounter the proposal of complex sovereignty, therefore it defines that the proper political representation, transforms and expands the politics in a way in which it not only promotes the translation of the social into the political, but also feeding the formation of groups and political identities. Urbinati also refers to a problematic face of political representation, as something that will never be able in fact to connect effectively representatives with people interests, expectations and accomplishments would never exactly coincide.

Urbinati cleverly defends what Rosanvallon states that is insufficient, what he actually searches to extend or to exceed in his explanation concerning the complex sovereignty. It is exactly because the models that Nadia Urbinati describes well never will be able to take into account the expectations of the represented, that the new demands called some times as a “new left”, or “non-governmental politics”, or still a politics of the governed has took place. The complex sovereignty as proposed by Rosanvallon accurately aims to apprehend these new processes.

The recent attempts to rethink the mechanisms of communication between the discontent sectors and the multiple social sectors that emerges of identity struggles, not only in Brazilian society (but internationally) must lead to investigation. As Vernant warned, do not allow access of any social segment to debate, leads frequently to religious thought. Imagine that there is only one way of political representation, a man, a vote, can be a perennial mythological form of representative government historical process, that itself guarantees nothing, and remains as a certainty in the contemporary political thought.

The necessity of coexisting and contradictory structures, far from mitigate the legitimate traditional sovereignty of parties electoral system, would produce a living
complex sovereignty. In Koselleck's words, all political rights had been first formulated in language, so that they could be conquered and also that it was possible to denominate them. After all the relation between the words and its use is the most important artifice in politics. Today, freedom to think about what is new in politics, can consist in turn political representation to a more elastic attitude considering the new social demands for participation and less orthodox in its practices.

Bibliography


KOSELLECK (2006), P. 77 and 102.


